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Abstract

The military deploys many Internet of Things (IoT) in battlefield operations to
provide information on terrain and enemy combatants. It also deploys automated
robots or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) where securing and trusting collected
data is essential. Choosing the middleware that handles this message transfer is
crucial for real-time operations. Networks with multiple entities, including IoT devices, UAVs, and small computers, require robust middleware facilitating message
sending in real-time. Ideally, the middleware would provide Quality of Service (QoS)
to handle lost packets and retransmissions in lossy environments, especially between
low-power machines. Data Distribution Service (DDS) is a middleware that implements real-time and QoS capabilities by sending messages, not based on endpoints
but topics. However, DDS nodes are susceptible to impersonation attacks, which
compromise integrity and trust. To mitigate these attacks, DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C)
is developed as a security layer that integrates with DDS by using Kerberos tickets
to identify and authenticate valid DDS nodes. This thesis evaluates DDS-C performance, determining if authentication overhead impedes DDS operations by using
Robot Operating System 2 (ROS 2) and Cyclone DDS as testbeds. Additionally,
DDS-C is integrated into a commercial network artificial intelligence (AI) provided
by Bright Apps as a real-world use case. The results of this research conclude that
DDS-C does not impact DDS operations to any significant degree. The added security and minimal middleware impact could help the military ensure node integrity in
operational missions.
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DDS-CERBERUS: IMPROVING SECURITY IN DDS MIDDLEWARE USING
KERBEROS TICKETS

I. Introduction
Technology use from handheld to stationary devices has melded private and public
sectors with similar software and architectures. This uniformity provides benefits such
as ease of use and interoperability; however, there are more security vulnerability risks.
Network and device resilience are of utmost priority to protect from exploitation.
This research explores DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C), a novel security layer, mitigating
node authentication vulnerabilities in Data Distribution Service (DDS). This chapter
goes over the research’s problem, motivation, and objectives.
1.1

Problem and Motivation
The military has adopted different technologies ranging from small Internet of

Things (IoT) devices to multi-layer software. Many of these technologies cannot
function effectively without a framework that provides communications in real-time.
The military has adopted the Object Management Group (OMG) DDS standard as
an integral part of several systems due to its robustness and easy integration. Different military systems use DDS on reliable real-time performance for decentralized
architectures where there are many moving components. One such DDS implementation is Real-Time Innovations (RTI) Connext DDS which has been deployed in
several systems such as in General Atomics (GA) Advanced Cockpit Ground Control
Stations and the United States (U.S.) Navy’s Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) [1, 2].
The U.S. Army also uses DDS which is a part of Robot Operating System-Military
1

(ROS-M) to support ground vehicle operations [3].
The military trusts their data and systems by using DDS because of continued
support with software patches. However, even with this reassurance, there are still
security vulnerabilities in old and new DDS implementations. The increase of publicfacing IoT devices and their vulnerabilities reveal that there are public-facing government devices found with vulnerabilities. Additionally, multiple access points, routers,
and handheld devices on military bases could be outdated or unsecured. One such
vulnerability is inadequate authentication due to low computational power and battery life [4]. Attackers can compromise data integrity through impersonation attacks
by spoofing nodes. This is a vulnerability faced by DDS and its Robot Operating
System 2 (ROS 2) implementation [5].

1.2

Research Objectives
The goal of this research is to explore the impact DDS-C, an authentication layer,

has on DDS operations and to conclude if the impact does not hinder DDS operations.
DDS-C is a novel security layer developed to mitigate inadequate authentication
and impersonation attacks on DDS [6, 7, 8, 9]. It authenticates DDS nodes with
Kerberos tickets using keytabs, long-term keys, before the nodes can send and receive
messages. No research was found that combined DDS and Kerberos. Through various
experiments measuring latency and packet capture traffic in different network setups,
DDS-C is shown to provide insignificant overhead to regular DDS operations.

1.3

Thesis Overview
This thesis is organized around four scholarly papers, each uniquely experimenting

DDS-C through concept and design, testing, and application. The chapters containing
papers are labeled by their titles. Chapter II, the background, explains the main
2

components of DDS-C and its setup which leads into the four papers. Chapter III,
the first paper, lays out the concept and design of DDS-C and initial experiments.
Chapter IV, the second paper, is the preliminary DDS-C testing measuring latency.
Chapter V, the third paper, provides more experiments by conducting statistical
analysis of packet capture quantities. Continuing this work, the fourth paper in
Chapter VI also captures packet quantities but applies the work to specific real world
use cases. Lastly, Chapter VII wraps up the thesis with a conclusion and future
works.

3

II. Background

This chapter provides essential information on two DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) components: Data Distribution Service (DDS) and Kerberos. In addition to DDS, this
chapter also describes the testbeds Robot Operating System 2 (ROS 2) Foxy Fitzroy
and Cyclone DDS. It also describes DDS-C and its development.

2.1

Data Distribution Service (DDS)
DDS is a publish-subscribe middleware protocol developed by Object Management

Group (OMG) [10]. It is an open standard that other vendors such as Real-Time Innovations (RTI), Eclipse Foundation, and eProsima can use to create implementations
[11]. Lying in between the operating system and the applications, DDS facilitates
sending messages over a network between different operating systems and architectures. It sends messages not based on source and destination but specified topics.
Topic examples are unique strings that determine where the message is delivered.
Quality of Service (QoS) attributes are used in conjunction with these topics to determine how messages behavior.
The DDS standard defines different layers to parse and send messages. The research uses the Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe (DCPS) layer because it is the layer
where messages are sent and received through a global domain space. Figure 1 shows
how messages are sent in DDS. Each node contains the relevant components. They
contain at least one domain participant which contain data writers, data readers,
publishers, and subscribers. Each publisher and subscriber uses a paired data writer
and data reader to write and read messages. Different topics are included in each
message to be sent by a publisher. Subscribers specify a topic and only read messages
that have the same topic. For example, a publisher sends a message with topic A,

4

and a subscriber searching for topic A can read that message’s data.

Figure 1: DDS Components and Data Flow [6]
Developers can modify publisher and subscriber behavior using different QoS attributes to affect message liveliness, reliability, and duration. For different network
setups and applications, selecting different combinations of QoS allows DDS to handle
situations such as operating in lossy environments or with large data files. In addition
to different network setups, DDS offers dynamic discovery that allows existing and
new DDS applications to communicate with each other during runtime. Dynamic
discovery also identifies what publishers and subscribers are doing on the network to
help match DDS participants.
5

Even with different vendors, the core components of DDS are the same across
all versions. Two different DDS implementations are the highlight of this research:
ROS 2 Foxy Fitzroy and Cyclone DDS. The next two subsections describe these two
implementations. Both are installed on Ubuntu Linux and use Python to create DDS
components for consistency.
2.1.1

Robot Operating System 2 (ROS 2)

This research uses ROS 2 as the main testbed for preliminary DDS-C testing
before experimenting DDS-C with Cyclone DDS for real-world use cases. ROS 2 is
chosen because of its popularity, ease of use, and integration with DDS. ROS 2 is built
from Robot Operating System (ROS) and introduces real-time capabilities through
DDS [12]. It was developed to help robotics development, but in this research, the
application is applied to Internet of Things (IoT) and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
technologies. The goal is to experiment with the DDS components of ROS 2. There
are many ROS 2 distributions, each with their benefits, such as what middleware
implementations they support. Due to its long-term support, ROS 2 Foxy Fitzroy is
chosen as the testbed [13]. It uses eProsmia Fast-RTPS as the default middleware
[14].
2.1.2

Cyclone DDS

Cyclone DDS is an open-source Eclipse IoT project that is akin to ROS 2 [15,
16]. It was developed to support Eclipse IoT projects and existing Eclipse solutions.
The Python binding for Cyclone DDS is used in this research [17]. Cyclone DDS is
hosted on GitHub for updates and improvements. Bright Apps is the research sponsor
using Cyclone DDS in its network architecture [18]. It uses this implementation to
control its UAVs and to send video frames for its artificial intelligence (AI) to process.

6

Integrating DDS-C into the Bright Apps architecture and network is important in
experimenting with real-world use cases such as search and rescue and battlefield
operations.

2.2

Kerberos
Kerberos is an authentication protocol used to provide authentication for entities

on the network by using symmetric key cryptography [19]. It was developed by
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and is open source. Kerberos handles
authentication by providing tickets that allow the authenticated entity to talk to
other entities on the network. The Key Distribution Center (KDC) provides the
ticket through the Authentication Server (AS), making sure the entity is registered,
and Ticket Granting Server (TGS), granting a ticket after verifying and authenticating
the entity. This authentication is demonstrated in Figure 2, a sequence diagram where
Node A is authenticating to a network to get permission to talk to Node B. Node A
first sends a message to the AS to talk to the TGS. Since it is registered, Node A
is authenticated and can talk to the TGS using a special message given by the AS.
Node A tells the TGS it wants to talk to Node B. The TGS gives Node A a ticket to
talk to Node B and a message for Node B. This message allows Node B to receive a
ticket, so it also receives permission to talk to Node A.
The Kerberos kinit command’s function provides a ticket given the correct credentials: username and password [20]. Each Kerberos service has a realm name identifier used to retrieve a ticket. For example, a user uses the username cerby to get a
ticket from Kerberos realm EXAMPLE.COM. After running kinit cerby@EXAMPLE.COM,
the user is prompted to enter the password for the account. If the username does not
exist, the user is not prompted. A way to streamline this process is to use keytabs,
long-term keys that do not expire [21]. Keytabs are created on a machine by pro-

7

Figure 2: Kerberos Authentication Sequence Diagram [6]
viding the encryption scheme, and the correct credentials for the realm [22]. The
resulting .keytab files are stored in a directory, usually in /tmp. The command to
run kinit with a keytab: kinit -k -t /tmp/cerby.keytab cerby@EXAMPLE.COM.
DDS-C utilizes keytabs to authenticate DDS participants. It is a crucial component
and important to understand when implementing and experimenting with DDS-C.

2.3

DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C)
DDS-C is a layer designed to add additional security to DDS by providing node

authentication [6, 7, 8, 9]. Its inception was brought up by papers identifying node
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integrity and authentication issues in different DDS and ROS 2 implementations [5,
23, 24]. Attackers were able to perform impersonation attacks on nodes to compromise
data integrity. DDS-C mitigates this concern by using Kerberos to authenticate nodes
or DDS participants. When a node is executed, and before its normal operation, it
calls the kinit command to receive a ticket. Each node has a unique keytab associated
with it, allowing for individual authentication. When the node receives a ticket, it can
resume normal operations. Kerberos authentication using keytabs prevents attackers
from impersonating because an attacker would need to steal or replicate a keytab to
be authenticated on the DDS domain.
Figure 3 outlines the authentication and message sending process with a publisher
and subscriber node. First, each node is authenticated by communicating with the
Kerberos Server KDC as seen in A and C; in this case, Publisher1 authenticates first
and then Subscriber1. After their authentication, they are able to perform normally
in B and D: Publisher1 sends a message with a topic that Subscriber1 is to receive.
Authentication happens at the beginning of the node lifetime; therefore, in E, the
subsequent messages are not interrupted by any DDS-C authentication.

9

Figure 3: DDS-C Authentication Process [8]
DDS, ROS 2, Cyclone DDS, and Kerberos are important components in understanding the creation of DDS-C. The next four chapters expand on this understanding
by providing more background, relevant works, and experimentation. Table 1 outlines the contributions the next four papers make using these components for DDS-C.
Chapter III introduces DDS-C by describing DDS, Kerberos, and ROS 2; chapter IV
flushes out DDS-C with more information on the three components with experimentation; chapter V quantifies packet traffic in ROS 2; and finally chapter VI introduces
Cyclone DDS and offers additional use case experimentation for DDS-C.
10

Table 1: DDS-C Papers
Chapter DDS-C Contribution
III

DDS-C initial concept by integrating Kerberos with DDS publishers
and subscribers. Includes experiment setup using ROS 2.
Experiment execution using ROS 2 and the integration of Kerberos

IV

keytabs. Measured the average processing times for baseline experiments against DDS-C experiments.
On ROS 2 with DDS-C, the packet traffic was captured and catego-

V

rized into different data categories to compare DDS-C authentication
traffic with DDS message traffic.

VI

Continuing the third paper’s work, Cyclone DDS was used as the
testbed to apply DDS-C in real-world use case experiments.
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III. Paper: DDS-Cerberus: Data Distribution via Ticketing

The following paper, “DDS-Cerberus: Data Distribution via Ticketing,” was submitted and accepted by the World Congress in Computer Science, Computer Engineering; it was published in July of 2021. This paper is in Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) format.
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DDS-Cerberus: Data Distribution via Ticketing
Andrew T. Park, Richard Dill, Douglas D. Hodson, Wayne C. Henry

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, USA
email: andrew.park@afit.edu, richard.dill@afit.edu, douglas.hodson@afit.edu, wayne.henry@afit.edu

Abstract—Data Distribution Service (DDS) has vulnerabilities
due to its publish-subscribe model. This paper proposes a novel
design, DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C), to increase Internet of Things
(IoT) security by integrating Kerberos authentication into ROS
2’s (Robot Operating System) DDS communication framework.
This method ties Kerberos’s key distribution center (KDC) with
specific QoS parameters to efficiently prevent common security
vulnerabilities such as replay attacks and data manipulation.
This research is a work in progress; in this paper, we detail
DDS-C and propose functional tests, security evaluations for
significant attacks, and performance assessments with varying
metrics. The anticipated results are that DDS’s vulnerabilities
would be mitigated through the KDC even with a large number
of entities and constant real-time data flow.
Index Terms—IoT, DDS, Kerberos, distributed system, publishsubscribe

I. I NTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT)-based architecture schemes offer
consumers different methods to cost-effectively and sustainably process IoT data. Whether it be individuals, companies,
or cities, this data introduces new insights into the increasingly
connected world.
There are many application-layer protocols to handle these
devices and data. Widely used publish-subscribe protocols
include Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT), mainly
for wireless and low-bandwidth networks [1], and Advanced
Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP), for business messaging
to establish reliable asynchronous communication [2]. The
third protocol and focus of this paper, Object Management
Group’s (OMG) Data Distribution Service (DDS) [3] [4], has
been used by various industries from finance to the government sector for approximately 30 years. It supports smart
grids, air-traffic control, healthcare, defense, and robotics [5].
Even though DDS has efficient data transportation, it has
security vulnerabilities when sending data over the network
such as data type manipulation and unregistered Publishers
and Subscribers [4]. To securely handle these issues, this
paper proposes DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C), a novel DDS publishsubscribe solution that uses Kerberos’s ticket system. The
evaluation experiments assess security and efficiency through
modifiable metrics. They are conducted with virtual machines
running modified ROS 2 (Robot Operating System) code
incorporating Kerberos open-source code.
Section II introduces the background in DDS and Kerberos.
Section III covers the DDS-C design approach. Section IV
presents the implementation details. Section V captures the

assumptions and limitations. Section VI offers conclusions and
recommendations for future research.
II. BACKGROUND
This section describes the Data Distribution Service (DDS)
and Kerberos and illustrates why they are used to improve
network security for distributed systems. Both have a publishsubscribe architecture; however, they differ in their data implementation and handling methods. DDS’s goal is to efficiently
transport data, while Kerberos aims to improve security via a
ticket granting server.
A. Overview of DDS
DDS transports data with definable quality-of-service
(QoS). Two popular implementations of the on Object Management Group’s (OMG) DDS standard are Real-Time Innovations (RTI) Connext DDS Secure [6], which adds more
security features such as asymmetric keys and certificate authorities, and OpenDDS [7] by Object Computing Incorporated
(OCI), which is an open-source C++ implementation [8] [9].
DDS has three layers: Data Local Reconstruction Layer
(DLRL), Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe (DCPS), and RealTime Publish-Subscribe (RTPS). This research focuses on the
DCPS layer because it provides core DDS elements [10].
Figure 1 illustrates the following components and data flow:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Domain: Main area of data transfer from Domain Participants.
Node: Contains at least one Domain Participant.
Domain Participant: The entity that participates in the
Domain. Contains Subscribers, Publishers, Writers, and
Topics.
Data Reader: An interface for the Subscriber to read
subscribed data.
Subscriber: The entity that reads data from Publishers.
Associated with at least one Data Writer.
Data Writer: An interface for the Publisher to write data
to be published.
Publisher: The entity that publishes data. Associated with
at least one Data Reader.
Topic: Defines the data sent in the Domain. Has three
characteristics: name, data type, and QoS.

Currently, there are 22 different QoS attributes that define
communication standards to transported data [9]. This paper
focuses on these two QoS attributes:

Fig. 1. DDS Components and Data Flow (reproduced from [8])

Ownership: SHARED Ownership - data published by
multiple entities at the same time. EXCLUSIVE Ownership - data published by a single entity at one time.
• Discovery: LOCATORLIST environment variable - helps
entities discover other Publishers or Subscribers.
There are two main reasons to use DDS over other protocols. First, in DDS, unlike many other architectures, data is
sent, not based on the source and destination but based on
specific attributes. The application developer that uses DDS
does not need to specify the destination for data sent to
other applications. Domain Participants need only access the
Domain to read or write data [11].
Second, DDS has a flexible publish-subscribe system since
data is referenced by data type in the Topic which helps determine how the data behaves. DDS is also flexible because it
has modifiable built-in plugins (e.g. functions for more secure
authentication and authorization in the Domain space [12]).
The flexibility gives developers and researchers more control
over features. Since DDS has plugins and a decentralized
system that focuses on data type, adding another layer of
security by incorporating Kerberos’s ticket system using plugin
functionality can improve security [4] [8].
•

B. Overview of Kerberos
Kerberos, managed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), is an open-source network authentication protocol [13]. The protocol allows nodes to communicate over a
non-secure network with tickets distributed after verification
with a server, the key distribution center (KDC). If a node
is not authorized by the KDC or does not have a ticket, it
cannot communicate with another node on the same network.
The KDC contains an authentication server (AS) and ticket
granting server (TGS) [14] [15]. For example in Figure 2,
node A wants to talk to node B:
1) A sends to AS: unencrypted message to talk to TGS.

Fig. 2. Kerberos Sequence Diagram [16]

2) AS sends to A: confirmation message with a session
key; encrypted message for TGS.
3) A sends to TGS: encrypted message (with session key)
that states it wants to talk with B; message for TGS
from AS.
4) TGS sends to A: A retrieves its ticket from TGSencrypted message with new session key between A and
B; encrypted message for B to send to TGS.
5) A sends to B: encrypted message to B with A’s time
stamp T SA ; message for TGS from A.
6) B sends to TGS: B retrieves its ticket from TGS.
7) B sends to A: encrypted message to A with T SA + 1.
The messages in Figure 2 have a nonce (n), a time stamp
(T S), and time-to-live (T T L). These attributes prevent replay
attacks and ensure logging of messages.
C. Motivation for DDS-C
This research uses Kerberos to improve DDS’s publishsubscribe system in DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C). There are three
main reasons: lasting credentials, more secure communication,
and increased data security.
First, the Kerberos credentials do not have to be changed
often due to the use of tickets. Administrators of this design do
not need to have a separate server to handle network access.
Second, Kerberos can provide a more secure communication
protocol. The transport protocol for DDS defaults to User
Datagram Protocol (UDP), but it can support Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP). DDS does not have a default method
to secure these protocols. One security protocol that TCP uses
is Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) which creates encrypted keys
for both client and server. Al-Ayed and Liu [16] compared
Kerberos to SSL and found that Kerberos was more secure
since it used the KDC to authenticate the credibility of nodes
and server. They found that the TGS creates and encrypts a

ticket that neither the client or AS knows about, therefore,
blocking sniffing attacks.
Third, Abdulghani et al. [9] compared security vulnerabilities of well-known protocols DDS, Message Queue Telemetry
Transport (MQTT), and Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN) to discuss main security issues and solutions. They
highlighted common vulnerabilities such as eavesdropping,
unauthorized access, and replay attacks for all three protocols.
They presented DDS’s security issues as unauthorized access
to data and devices, data manipulation, network disruption, and
eavesdropping. Section IV outlines DDS-C tests to address and
mitigate these issues.
The following section proposes a complementary novel
security scheme that supports efficiency while upholding the
CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) security principles.

Data Readers and Data Writers to Subscribers and Publishers.
The KDC framework manages tickets assigned to Subscribers
and Publishers.
A. DDS-C: DDS with Kerberos
The Kerberos ticket function uses tickets linked with
quality-of-service (QoS) to ensure the CIA (confidentiality,
integrity, availability) security principles. DDS-C is more efficient and sustainable for Internet of Things (IoT) sensors that
need to send in continuous streams of data. Tickets base their
longevity on specific QoS parameters and defined categories of
Subscribers and Publishers. Kerberos keeps its functionality,
but the main change is that certain linked tickets, instead of
being separate from each other, receive data from specified
end points.
In Figure 3, the KDC is part of the Domain to authenticate
and distribute tickets. A ticket is added to a Topic (name,
type, QoS, ticket). Each Subscriber and Publisher registers
with the authentication server (AS). Afterward, they go to
the ticket granting server (TGS) to retrieve a ticket. There
can be multiple Data Writers and Data Readers assigned
to a Subscriber and Publisher, respectively. In DDS, each
Subscriber and Publisher can either be associated with Data
Writers and Data Readers; however, DDS-C modifies this rule
by only having Subscribers associated with Data Readers and
Publishers associated with Data Writers.

Fig. 3. DDS-C sequence diagram demonstrating Topic with ticket functionality

III. D ESIGN
DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) is a novel communication protocol that combines Kerberos security with Data Distribution
Service’s (DDS) efficiency for Internet of Things (IoT) data.
Adding a ticket to the Topic protects against data vulnerabilities: sending in plain text, unencryption, and data manipulation. The main focus of DDS-C is Kerberos’s key distribution
center (KDC) that uses symmetric keys and tickets. This
section describes DDS-C’s ticket and Topic system and states
its benefits.
When using DDS-C, the users who register with devices
such as IoT devices, external servers, computers reading data
are either a Data Writer or Data Reader assigned to a
Subscriber or Publisher. Each Subscriber and Publisher has a
ticket given by the KDC. Data Writers give data for the Subscriber to send, and Data Readers read data retrieved by the
Publisher. The DDS framework handles the management of

Fig. 4. DDS-C sequence diagram demonstrating ticket reissuing

Instead of only storing tickets in Kerberos, the KDC in
DDS-C stores the QoS with its respective ticket. If the
Ownership is SHARED for a ticket, then any entity can query
it. When the Ownership is EXCLUSIVE, then only one entity
can query it. The KDC tracks who has the ticket and either

Fig. 5. DDS-C Implementation: Layer Diagram with ROS 2 [8]

prevents or allows other entities from receiving tickets based
on the QoS. Let each ticket be T . If a Subscriber wants to
read data from a Publisher, the Publisher first needs to query
the KDC to get a ticket T 10 as seen in Figure 3. Next, the
Subscriber identifies that the Publisher received a ticket and
then queries the KDC to get ticket T 11 that corresponds to
the Publisher by having the same name but unique subset
of the base ticket. Depending on QoS Ownership, multiple
Subscribers can get data from the Publisher and have the
ticket name and unique subset n: T 12 , T 13 , T 14 , ..., T 1n+1 . In
Figure 3, Subscriber1 can read the data sent by the Publisher1
since it has the same ticket name T 1, but Subscriber2 cannot
because this ticket is not tied to Publisher1’s ticket T 1.
The ticket’s time-to-live (T T L) depends on when the ticket
granting server (TGS) distributed it. In Figure 4, the TGS
assigns a T T L to a ticket (not an individual data message).
After the T T L expires, the ticket is invalid, and when a
Subscriber or Publisher wants to subscribe or publish any
data, it needs to query the KDC for a new ticket. The KDC
and Domain do not send a negative acknowledgment (NACK)
when a ticket expires; they send a NACK if a Subscriber
or Publisher sends a message with an expired ticket. If a
Publisher receives a new ticket due to a NACK and if any
Subscribers sent messages that were tied to the Publisher’s
expired ticket, the TGS sends out a NACK to these Subscribers
to get a new ticket. Publisher1 in Figure 4 receives a new ticket

T 20 since ticket T 10 ’s T T L expired. Therefore, Subscriber1
and Subscriber2, since they are tied to T 1, are notified by
a NACK that their tickets have expired. They respond by
requesting a new ticket T 21 and T 22 , respectively.
B. Benefits
Kerberos applies symmetric key encryption after the initial
public key exchange required for user registering which is
faster than exclusively using public key encryption [17].
Furthermore, it has been predicted that quantum computers
will be able to break public key encryption in contrast to
symmetric keys [18]. Symmetric key cryptography is an inexpensive cryptographic function suitable for low-power Internet
of Things (IoT) devices. It does not have to use certificate
authorities for security due to session keys and tickets [19].
The use of a symmetric key prevents attackers from changing
the quality-of-service (QoS) Ownership or Discovery to route
data to other sources. Even though attackers can sniff network
traffic, the messages are encrypted through symmetric keys
which are reinforced by the issued tickets. The use of a nonce
(n), time-to-live (T T L), and time stamp (T S) are crucial to
prevent replay attacks. Implementing a key distribution center
(KDC) in the Domain only allows authorized Subscribers and
Publishers to access data and talk to other entities. Only
authorized entities with valid tickets have access to certain
data, and the ticket’s T T L ensures that old tickets are not

used for long periods, precluding replay attacks and data
manipulation.
IV. I MPLEMENTATION
Implementation testing focuses on three areas: functionality,
security, and performance. To test DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C)
functionality, ROS 2 (Robot Operating System) is used as
the Data Distribution Service’s (DDS) model modified with
a plugin that adds in Kerberos security. These tests are simulated with different scenarios. The security evaluation tests
DDS-C against eavesdropping, Internet Protocol (IP) spoofing,
denial-of-service (DoS) / distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks,
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, and replay attacks. The
performance assessments outline how the functional tests
are performed with varying parameters in entity size, data
transmission, and file size. This research is a work in progress,
and its proposed evaluations will be detailed in a later paper.
A. Setup
Figure 5 illustrates how DDS-C implementation works by
having four prominent layers: Internet of Things (IoT), ROS 2,
DDS Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe (DCPS), and operating
system (OS) layer. A network of virtual machines (VMs)
would be set up with one server which hosts ROS 2, DDS, and
Kerberos functions and middleware. In the IoT layer, each IoT
sensor entity represents a Data Writer assigned to a Publisher;
a function emulates this and sends Topic data. The ROS 2
Client Library modifies and complements the DDS DCPS
layer; a DDS plugin in C++ code implements the DDS-C’s
Kerberos modifications. Data Readers, one or more virtual
clients, receive data Topics going to the OS layer. The goal
is for DDS-C to allow devices to securely send and receive
messages using tickets in various tests.
TABLE I
S IMULATION S CENARIOS

Number of
Subscribers
Number of
Publishers
Number of
Data Writers
Number of
Data Readers

1
5

2
10

3
10

Scenario
4
5
20
15

6
30

7
20

8
40

5

10

10

20

30

20

40

15

100

200

300

400

100

200

300

400

B. Simulations
Testing focuses on Subscribers, Publishers, Data Writers,
and Data Readers. Table I has eight unique scenarios. Each
Subscriber and Publisher in scenarios 1, 3, 5, and 7 are tied to
20 Data Writers and 20 Data Readers, respectively. Likewise,
each Subscriber and Publisher in scenarios 2, 4, 6, and 8 are
tied to 10 Data Writers and 10 Data Readers, respectively.
Table II outlines the tests done in the three areas: functionality, security, and performance. All tests are simulated with
the eight scenarios in Table I.

TABLE II
S IMULATION T ESTS
Functional Test

Security Evaluation

Performance Assessments

Tests
Analyze registration processing time for
Subscribers and Publishers in the authentication server (AS).
Analyze ticket processing time for Subscribers and Publishers in the ticket
granting server (TGS).
Analyze expired time-to-live (T T L)
ticket redistribution processing time for
Subscribers and Publishers.
Evaluate against vulnerabilities with a
malicious actor:
• Eavesdropping attacks.
• IP spoofing attacks.
• DoS/DDoS attacks.
• MITM attacks.
• Replay attacks.
Analyze data processing time for sending messages:
• Send small 10-100 kb files such as
text files and small graphics.
• Send large 1-5 mb files such as
high-resolution JPEG images and
mp3 files.

Functional Test analyzes the processing time for authentication, ticket retrieval, and ticket redistribution by measuring
the round-trip time (RT T ) of sending the message and getting
a response from the key distribution center (KDC). The
amount of messages sent equals the number of Subscribers
and Publishers.
Security Evaluation evaluates major attacks, eavesdropping,
IP spoofing, DoS/DDoS, MITM, and replay attacks, encompassing Abdulghani et al.’s [9] DDS security vulnerabilities.
One message is sent for each attack per each test. Security
Evaluation focuses on the attempting access phase. This phase
is selected since keys and tickets are used to prevent and
deter outsider access and manipulation of data. Attempting
access would be client-side attacks attempting to steal session
keys, gain authorization, and manipulate data. The research,
however, does not focus on what happens when an attacker
registers into the authentication server (AS). Listeners (e.g.,
Wireshark [20]) collect this data on the same network during
transmission.
Performance Assessments analyzes ticket redistribution and
the amount of data sent per interval of time. There are five
sub-tests for the number of messages sent: 100,000, 200,000,
300,000, 400,000, and 500,000 messages. The following metrics are measured:
• Samples per second: the number of messages a Subscriber receives per time unit (second).
• Throughput: the amount of memory in bytes the Subscriber receives per time unit (second).
Each sub-test will be tested with randomly selected 10-100 kb
files and 1-5 mb files.
These tests measure DDS-C’s ticket system’s ability to

handle a small and large number of Subscribers and Publishers
with transferring varying file sizes.
V. L IMITATIONS
Even though the system is robust with symmetric keys and
a ticket system, there are some vulnerabilities. The initial
communication to register an entity in the authentication server
(AS) is sent with public key encryption that could be broken
and easily attacked with a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.
Once a malicious actor registers with AS, they are trusted,
and there is no inherent mechanism in DDS and Kerberos to
identify the intruder. Attackers can also attempt a replay attack
by emulating the tickets. Depending on the time-to-live (T T L)
of a ticket, ticket redistribution could become a problem if
there were numerous Subscribers and Publishers that needed
new tickets at one time which could slow or crash the key
distribution center (KDC).
VI. C ONCLUSION
Data Distribution Service (DDS) has many security vulnerabilities in its publish-subscribe model and quality-of-service
(QoS) policies. DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) is a possible novel
solution to these vulnerabilities. It focuses on two central
QoS policies in DDS and uses symmetric encryption, key
distribution center (KDC), and tickets. DDS-C focuses on
using ROS 2 (Robot Operating System) as its DDS middleware
and configuring it to incorporate Kerberos as a plugin to
perform DDS-C tests.
Smart systems in the military, healthcare, and cities would
benefit from a robust system like DDS-C. This paper proposes
a design that could handle the data-management burden of
being smart through its modified publish-subscribe system and
Topics. ROS 2 simulation testing is planned for future work.
Internet of Things (IoT) is a vast field that demands attention
to security to prevent common vulnerabilities.
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Abstract—Data Distribution Service (DDS) is a publishsubscribe middleware used to distribute data between real-time
systems, production environments, and small embedded platforms. In DDS, Nodes have at least one Publisher or Subscriber.
Publishers and Subscribers use unique Topics to send and receive
messages. Each Subscriber has permission to read the Publisher’s
message if it references the same Topic sent from the Publisher.
This capability supports real-time communication, sacrificing
security, such as impersonation attacks.
This paper details, tests, and evaluates DDS-Cerberus (DDSC), a novel distributed communication protocol integrating Kerberos ticketing system with DDS. DDS-C integrates Kerberos authentication and Ticket retrieval with Publishers and Subscribers.
Experiments have six parameters each with a 2:1 Publisher to
Subscriber ratio. Performance tests modify the message byte
size to emulate .txt and .mp3 files: 10 KB, 100 KB, 1 MB, 5
MB, 10 MB, and 20 MB. Experiment metrics for functionality
and performance are the messages per second and latency in a
wired environment. Experiments utilize ROS 2 (Robot Operating
System) as a testbed. Initial tests for a baseline are conducted
without DDS modifications and subsequent tests with DDS-C
modifications. The results reveal that due to the ticketing component, DDS-C increases DDS security by preventing impersonation
attacks while negligibly increasing average processing compared
to baseline results.
Index Terms—DDS, Kerberos, ROS 2, publish-subscribe, impersonation

I. I NTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of technology and the Internet,
interest and development in robots has had constant attention
and growth. Cyber-physical systems such as robotic systems,
smart grids, and industrial control systems rely on real-time
data streams to function correctly. These systems require
software that can handle loss or delay of connection from
local to long-range communications. They also need to be
modifiable so that other products and prototypes can use the
same software to test and apply for real-world use.
One such software for real-time use is ROS (Robot Operating System). Beginning as ROS 1, its design goals are
summarized as multi-programming language friendly, easy
to update and navigate, and open-source [1]. These goals
have been integrated into other versions of ROS 1 over the
years, rising in popularity. However, with the increasing use
of wireless networks, ROS 1’s TCP-based communication
(Transmission Control Protocol) layer did not meet real-time
standards in this environment. ROS 2 with Data Distribution
Service (DDS) was developed to meet real-time needs due

to its Quality-of-Service, and publish-subscribe interface [2].
Different ROS 2 versions handle the management of Publishers and Subscribers in different ways, such as through key
exchanges and access control [3]. DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C)
focuses on modifying DDS and utilizing ROS 2 as the main
testbed for experiments for its DDS implementation. It utilizes
Kerberos to authenticate every Publisher and Subscriber by
creating Tickets with a keytab, a long-term key. After authentication, those Publishers and Subscribers can publish or read
data. The experiments are split into evaluation categories for
functionality and performance.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the background in DDS and Kerberos. Section III
presents the implementation framework and analysis of DDSC performance. Section IV is a security discussion of DDS-C.
Section V offers conclusions and recommendations for future
research.
II. BACKGROUND
This section introduces and describes the main functionalities and features of Data Distribution Service (DDS) and
Kerberos. These functions and features are highlighted as
pillars for the development, motivation, and functionality of
DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C). This section also presents related
works for experiments and their evaluations.
A. Overview of DDS
DDS uses Quality-of-Service policies that dictate transport
behavior, such as message queue size and lifespans. These
policies allow User Datagram Protocol (UDP) to be reliable or best-effort as Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).
This research focuses on the Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe
(DCPS) layer, which contains DDS main components used
by ROS 2 (Robot Operating System) [4]. Due to its realtime capability, DDS is widely used, especially with ROS
2. The main components DDS-C focuses on are these two
components found in the Node component: Publishers which
receive data from one to many Data Writers, and Subscribers
which receive data for one to many Data Readers. Each data
published has a unique Topic that Subscribers can specify to
receive.
1) ROS 2: Since its inception, ROS 2 has had several
distributions [5]: Dashing Diademata, Galactic Geochelone,
and Foxy Fitzroy. It can be built or installed on Linux, macOS,

and Windows. The versatility of ROS 2 is due to Object
Management Group’s (OMG) DDS [6]. Though DDS does
not have extensive wikis or Github repositories, DDS vendors
support research towards improving ROS 2. OMG’s DDSSecurity specification adds Service Plugin Interfaces (SPIs)
[7] [8]. There are three specific SPIs utilized by ROS 2
that are mandatory for compliant DDS implementations. This
standardization helps with interoperability and cross-vendor
support and integration.
• Authentication: Utilizes Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
and Certificate Authority (CA), called DDS:Auth:PKIDH, that binds a participant’s public key to a specific
name.
• Access Control: Allows the user to modify participant
permissions (i.e., to specific domain, to specific topic).
• Cryptographic: Uses Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) in Galois Counter Mode (AES-GCM). Implemented as DDS:Crypto:AES-GCM-GMAC.
In this paper’s implementation, ROS 2 serves as the main
testbed for DDS-C experiments. The paper does not focus on
robots or the effect on robots but on improving DDS.
B. Overview of Kerberos
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol that uses
symmetric key cryptography to securely prove identities to
a server using Tickets [9] [10]. To authenticate with the Key
Distribution Center (KDC), which contains the Authentication
Server (AS) and Ticket-Granting Server (TGS), a user has to
register with the AS via a username and password securely.
Subsequent communications after registration and authentication use symmetric keys. Kerberos uses UDP port 88 by
default. This experiment uses Kerberos V5 in Linux, krb5.
To gain a Ticket, a user uses kinit with a Kerberos name
(e.g., kinit primary/instance@REALM) [11]. A name
contains three parts:
• Primary: User’s or service’s name. Commonly known as
the principal.
• Instance: Used to describe credentials. Can be in a
privileged group as “root” or “admin.”
• Realm: The Kerberos service providing authentication
and Tickets for a specified principal.
These parts are stored in the Kerberos server’s Kerberos
database that has a Kerberos realm. After authenticating with
the AS, the user obtains credentials to use the Ticket, a
corresponding Ticket and Ticket session key.
C. Related Works
This research utilizes performance experiments from J. Kim
et al. [12]. The authors evaluated latency and throughput
between two machines that have ROS 2 setups. Their experiments had two categories: wired with Ethernet and wireless
with a Virtual Private Network over Wi-Fi. They focused on
performance with estimated latency and throughput per packet.
Thulasiraman et al. [13] evaluated ROS 2 wireless network
performance by measuring latency and message drop rate.

The authors modified differing Quality-of-Service settings and
security features on a small number of Nodes to measure
ROS’s performance.
C. Kim et al. [14] developed a DDS simulator using QualNet to test the performance of different DDS implementations.
Their eight simulations tested the number and performance of
sent and received messages between Data Writers and Data
Readers. They focused on DDS’s discovery capability and
speed of message processing.
These related works evaluate at least one of these areas:
experiments and performance. None of these works combine
DDS with Kerberos; however, they have techniques and methods beneficial to developing and implementing DDS-C.
III. I MPLEMENTATION
The goal of conducting DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) experiments is to describe its capabilities and to determine the impact
Ticket functionality has on the Data Distribution Service
(DDS) performance. This section explains DDS-C’s design
and focuses on its average processing time for Publishers
and Subscribers when executing ROS 2 (Robot Operating
System). It compares performance with no modifications as
a benchmark compared with DDS-C modifications.
A. Overview of DDS-C
A. T. Park et al.’s DDS-Cerberus: Data Distribution via
Ticketing [15] is the groundwork for DDS-C’s inception and
background. This previous paper outlines the background, design, and motivation for DDS-C and subsequent experiments.
The current paper refines and improves the DDS-C design and
uses the previous paper’s plan for experiments as a guideline.
DDS-C is setup with ROS 2 Foxy Fitzroy [16] and Kerberos
V5 [10] in a Linux OS. Table I outlines the equipment specifications for experiments. Foxy, the Host laptop, maintains
ROS 2 domain and workspaces, and the Kerberos server is
on a virtual machine in VMware with the name Kerby. Both
machines have Ubuntu installed. This setup is tested wired
through Ethernet with Foxy and Kerby on the same bridged
subnet.
TABLE I
E QUIPMENT S PECIFICATIONS
Name
Machine
OS
CPU
Disk Space
RAM

Host
Foxy
Laptop
Ubuntu 20.04.2 LTS
11th Gen i7-1185G7
8 Cores
2 TB
31 GB

Kerberos Server
Kerby
VMware
Ubuntu 20.04.2 LTS
11th Gen i7-1185G7
2 Cores
20 GB
4 GB

To obtain Tickets using Kerberos commands (e.g., kinit,
klist, kdestroy), both systems require a Kerberos installation, but all principals are stored on Kerby. Tickets are
requested and stored in a cache on Foxy. ROS 2 Publishers and
Subscribers request for Tickets and principal information from

Kerby. Tickets have a default time-to-live (T T L) of 24 hours
which can be changed depending on the user’s preference.
With multiple Publishers and Subscribers, creating new
Tickets would require manual credential input; however, Kerberos has a keytab functionality that allows creation of
long-term keys called keytabs. Keytabs are created with a
principal and its password. A keytab consists of a timestamp, principal name, key version number, encryption type,
and encryption key. All keytabs are encoded with enctype -e aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96. Regardless of a
Ticket’s status, every time a Publisher or Subscriber is started
up, a new Ticket is created using the keytab and principal (e.g.
kinit -k -t /tmp/keytabs/<username>.keytab
primary/instance@REALM). Keytabs do not have to be
renewed or changed unless the corresponding principal’s
password is changed, making them favorable for long-term
Publisher and Subscriber use. For the experiments, they are
stored in Foxy. To ensure additional security, Tickets and
keytabs are stored in directory /tmp; therefore, when Foxy
reboots, all requested data will be destroyed. For multiple
systems, the keytabs are only stored on the machine that
needs to authenticate a specific Node. Due to the keytab’s
longevity and function, DDS-C focuses on using them as its
main verification tool for Nodes.
This setup is illustrated as a diagram in Figures 1 and 2. For
each Node, the dotted lines in Figure 1 represent Publisher1,
Publisher2, and Subscriber1’s communication with the Key
Distribution Center (KDC) and the solid lines in Figure 2
represent message sending. They first send a kinit with a
corresponding keytab. The KDC sends back a Ticket allowing
the Publisher or Subscriber to interact with messages through
the Topic. To simulate many Data Writers and Data Readers
sending data, Publishers and Subscribers send data out at
a buffered interval to time performance accurately without
creating message queues.

Fig. 1. DDS-C KDC Authentication using Keytab

Fig. 2. DDS-C Post-Authentication Message Sending

The experiment components are based on these three scenarios. Benchmark category tests one scenario. DDS-C category
tests two Ticket scenarios. The benchmark category is considered the baseline in these experiments since it is measuring
regular ROS 2 message sending without DDS-C.
•

Benchmark:

•

DDS-C:

B. Methodology
All scenarios and tests are executed on Foxy through bash
scripts executing Python scripts in parallel. There are two main
experiment components. Both components focus on latency.
•
•

Functionality: Collecting processing times for requesting,
retrieving, and modifying Tickets (samples per second).
Performance: Collecting processing times for messages
sending different file sizes.

These test categories will be using six simulations with a
2:1 ratio of Publishers and Subscribers outlined in Table II.
This experiment focuses on using Python to write Publishers
and Subscribers. Each Publisher sends a total of 10 messages.
Using the Python time module’s time.time(), the processing durations of sent and received messages are recorded for
both categories. There is a time buffer of 0.5 seconds between
each message sent. Using the setup in Figures 1 and 2, each
two Publishers in each parameter have a unique Topic and
principal. One Subscriber is listening for this Topic and also
has a unique principal.

– Scenario 1: Create a regular Publisher and Subscriber with no Ticket capabilities.
– Scenario 2: When a Ticket already exists in the
klist for both Publisher and Subscriber.
– Scenario 3: Retrieving a new Ticket using kinit for
both Publisher and Subscriber. This test covers what
happens when a Ticket is expired since the procedure
to get a new Ticket is identical.

Results are documented in tables with average Publisher and
Subscriber times in seconds. A total average is calculated to
compare benchmark and DDS-C categories.
TABLE II
S IMULATIONS
Simulation
Number of Publishers
Number of Subscribers

1
2
1

2
4
2

3
6
3

4
8
4

5
10
5

6
12
6

C. Tests
The functionality tests measure both benchmark and DDSC categories with three scenarios and six simulations. The
messages sent in these tests contain the 63-byte string “Hello
World: <message id>”. Let n be the amount of messages:
message id = 0, 1, ..., n.
Performance tests collect times from six different file sizes:
10 KB, 100 KB, 1 MB, 5 MB, 10 MB, and 20 MB. They
are emulating files such as .txt, .png, .jpg, and .mp3 files that
could be sent over the network. Each file sent was generated
with randomized characters (a-z) for each file size. Both
benchmark and DDS-C tests run simulation 1. DDS-C tests
only the performance of scenario 2 because the time to run
Kerberos commands will not change performance test results
since message creation, delivery, and retrieval happen after
authentication and Ticket retrieval.

TABLE III
B ENCHMARK F UNCTIONALITY T EST: S CENARIO 1
Simulation
Avg Pub
Time (sec)
Avg Sub
Time (sec)

2
5.0408

3
5.0446

4
5.0518

5
5.0704

6
5.1055

Total Avg
5.0575

5.0488

5.0624

5.0941

5.1183

5.1041

5.1684

5.0994

TABLE IV
DDS-C F UNCTIONALITY T EST: S CENARIO 2
Simulation
Avg Pub
Time (sec)
Avg Sub
Time (sec)

1
5.0396

2
5.0435

3
5.0494

4
5.0732

5
5.0771

6
5.3662

Total Avg
5.1082

5.0668

5.0348

5.0907

5.0860

5.1362

5.3854

5.1333

TABLE V
DDS-C F UNCTIONALITY T EST: S CENARIO 3

D. Results
The functionality tests reveal that Table III benchmark total
average times are lower than DDS-C times in Table IV and
V. Times in each Avg Pub and Sub Time follow a general
upward trend. Between scenarios 1 and 2, average Publisher
and Subscriber times differed by a latency of 0.0507 and
0.0339 seconds, respectively. Between 1 and 3, a latency of
0.4599 and 0.4786 seconds. Between scenarios 2 and 3, a
latency of 0.4092 and 0.4447 seconds. The average to check
and retrieve a Ticket is 0.427 seconds, the average of 0.4092
and 0.4447.
Performance tests showed that Table VI’s benchmark average times are lower than Table VII. These results also had an
upward trend. Between scenarios 1 and 2, average Publisher
and Subscriber times differed by a latency of 0.0138 and 0.024
seconds, respectively. If accounting for Tickets as in scenario
3, the difference would be around 0.4408 and 0.451 seconds.
Through the test results and compared total averages, DDSC performs on average less than a second slower than an
unmodified ROS 2. The difference is a minor setback because
Ticket checking and retrieval occurs at the creation of a Publisher and Subscriber; therefore, it does not hinder message
sending and retrieval.

1
5.0312

Simulation
Avg Pub
Time (sec)
Avg Sub
Time (sec)

1
5.6649

2
5.5044

3
5.5623

4
5.3835

5
5.4111

6
5.5783

Total Avg
5.5174

5.6593

5.5844

5.5873

5.4718

5.5328

5.6417

5.5780

TABLE VI
B ENCHMARK P ERFORMANCE T EST: S CENARIO 1

Avg Pub
Time (sec)
Avg Sub
Time (sec)

10 kb
5.0325

100 kb
5.0344

Simulation 1
1 mb
5 mb
5.0358
5.0401

10 mb
5.0544

20 mb
5.068

Total Avg
5.0442

5.0569

5.0472

5.0447

5.0687

5.0799

5.0602

5.0638

TABLE VII
DDS-C P ERFORMANCE T EST: S CENARIO 2

Avg Pub
Time (sec)
Avg Sub
Time (sec)

10 kb
5.0434

100 kb
5.0490

Simulation 1
1 mb
5 mb
5.0547
5.0582

10 mb
5.0654

20 mb
5.0772

Total Avg
5.0580

5.0664

5.0641

5.0771

5.0865

5.1328

5.0842

5.0784

IV. S ECURITY D ISCUSSION
An impersonation attack, or also known as a spoofing attack,
is when an attacker compromises a system’s integrity by
impersonating a legitimate node due to weak authentication
[17]. DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) mitigates impersonation attacks,
a well-known Data Distribution Service (DDS) and ROS 2
(Robot Operating System) vulnerability.
DDS-C focuses on situations when an attacker compromises
a system on the same network DDS and ROS 2 resides.
The attacker can perform impersonation attacks by setting up
illegitimate Nodes. To enforce the integrity of inter-Node communication, DDS-C verifies the validity of a Node’s Publisher
and Subscriber through keytabs before any messages are sent
or retrieved. In real-world, large-scale experiments, each Node
could be on separate systems; therefore, keytabs are stored

only on the system that requires its use of specific Publishers
and Subscribers through the Key Distribution Center (KDC).
By introducing ticketing capability, DDS-C mitigates impersonation through keytab use. Each Publisher and Subscriber
need a unique Kerberos principle and with it a unique keytab.
The kinit command cannot complete if it does not have the
correct keytab in the same system. In Figure 3, an attacker
on the same network, but on a system independent of ROS
2, creates a Node with a Publisher or Subscriber. The top
solid black circle is the starting point of both legitimate and
illegitimate pub/sub actions, and the bottom solid black circle
with a circle is the endpoint, resulting in success or failure.
The squares represent the choice the pub/subs are going to
make. The dashed path of the illegitimate pub/sub leads to

an unsuccessful authorization because it has the incorrect
keytab to send to the KDC. The attacker needs to replicate
or steal a corresponding keytab to impersonate successfully.
The legitimate pub/sub ends in a successful authorization to
send and receive messages because it has the correct matching
keytab resulting in a success.

DDS-C’s performance does not significantly interrupt DDS
functionality. Future work includes integrating DDS-C into a
real-world operational testbed to optimize the DDS-C security
features further. Many works evaluate DDS, but none combines Kerberos ticket capabilities with it. Incorporating DDS-C
in growing DDS and, subsequently, ROS 2 and its distributions
would help to reduce the risk of security vulnerabilities in realtime systems.
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Abstract

Selecting a secure and efficient middleware to process data is critical
to assure the security properties and quality of service for communications between nodes within modern distributed systems and applications.
Researchers have determined that Data Distribution Service (DDS) (a
popular middleware used in industry, government, and military applications) is vulnerable to data and node integrity attacks. In contrast, DDSCerberus (DDS-C) is a novel security layer with foundational DDS components designed to mitigate impersonation attacks by requiring node
authentication with Kerberos. This research provides an analysis of DDSC, evaluating the layer’s overhead and security features, by assessing total
packet traffic generated in a robotics network. The experiment has a 2:1
publisher to subscriber node ratio, varying the number of subscribers and
publisher nodes from three to eighteen. By categorizing the traffic from
these nodes into either data message, security, or discovery+ with Quality of Service (QoS) best effort and reliable, the mean security traffic
from DDS-C has minimal impact to DDS operations when compared to
the other traffic. The results reveal that applying DDS-C to a representative distributed network does not substantially impact performance.
Keywords: Kerberos, DDS, ROS 2, Cyclone DDS, QoS, reliability
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1 Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) technologies and cyber-physical systems rely on realtime and efficient communication capabilities across various environments to
support consumer, agricultural, and military use cases. Thermostats, audio,
and video devices increase consumers’ quality of life through smart home environments [1]. Industry depends on low-power IoT devices to monitor crop
yield, improve livestock health, and reduce environmental threats to agricultural success [2]. The military depends on a dynamic network connecting air,
land, sea, and space assets [3]. In addition to reliability and security challenges,
these networks need to account for connectivity and power issues.
Data Distribution Service (DDS) is a robust, flexible, open middleware
standard designed to manage real-time communication between various cyberphysical devices. Its popularity is evident from the wide adoption in public
and private sectors, including military and finance frameworks [4]. DDS offers
configurable Qualities of Service (QoS) associated with data. Topics are keywords chosen by the user to differentiate and categorize messages. Subscribers
that specify the same topic can only read that type of message. Topics are
used in Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communication to effectively allow publishers and subscribers to send and read data in a global space [5]. While DDS
meets robustness, reliability, and efficiency requirements, it lacks some security features. The main security vulnerability in DDS, impersonation, allows a
motivated adversary to gain unauthorized access to reading and sending data
by posing as a trusted entity and node [6–8].
With security lacking as a foundation component in the standard, attackers
have multiple methods to attack DDS through QoS policies, network participant discovery, and node impersonation. This research focuses on node
impersonation through impersonation attacks. Attackers create rogue DDS
nodes to send disruptive messages to other nodes. A solution is to authenticate
publisher and subscriber node components before they send messages. DDSCerberus (DDS-C), a novel secure distributed communication layer, adds this
additional authentication mechanisms to DDS that improve security authentication to prevent impersonation attacks [9, 10]. DDS-C secures the network
by integrating DDS node authentication with Kerberos tickets. The motivation of this research to add security stems from the desire to use the real-time
communication properties of DDS with DDS-C authentication. No previous
work in DDS has used Kerberos tickets to authenticate nodes.
This research’s experiment measures the DDS-C traffic imposed on a
network compared to regular DDS operations to determine if incorporating
DDS-C into DDS hinders these operations. The goal of the experiment is to
characterize the total network traffic to analyze, categorize, and process the
number of packets per protocol. The network traffic types of interest include
data message, security, and discovery+. The data message has the topic, security refers to the DDS-C authentication messages, and discovery+ corresponds
to the DDS node discovery messages and additional network packets. When
testing, the packets are collected for two network configurations. The purpose
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of the first configuration is to transmit messages on the same system, and the
purpose of the second is to send messages through the network. Different QoS
settings are selected for each configuration to show that DDS-C authentication
traffic does not substantially delay sent DDS messages. The QoS of interest is
reliability with two message behaviors, best effort and reliable.
The results of the experiment use a set p-value of α 0.05 to quantify packet
traffic statistically. If the results are statistically significant, DDS-C authentication affects DDS message traffic. The various packet protocols are categorized
into data message, security, and discovery+ and compared to determine the
DDS-C security traffic trends. This paper contributes to existing DDS work in
security and performance. It presents a security layer that others can explore
and add to their DDS implementations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines DDS and DDS-C.
It also lists related research on performance and security for DDS, Kerberos,
and ROS 2. Section 3 explains the set up for the experiment, research assumptions and limitations, and gathering and processing captured packet data.
It also explores and analyzes the data. Section 4 provides future research
recommendations.

2 Background
This section provides background information on the functionality and purpose
of Data Distribution Service (DDS) and DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C). Understanding how middleware services function is essential to improving security in
real-world applications.
Other researchers have compared DDS to various communication protocols,
highlighting performance, latency, and throughput differences. What makes
DDS-C different is its fusing of both DDS’ efficiency and Kerberos’ authentication capabilities. Additionally, it is important to focus on the security
and efficiency of Kerberos and ROS 2 (Robot Operating System). These past
works form the foundation for understanding the research methodology and
evaluation of DDS-C in this paper.

2.1 Data Distribution Service (DDS)
DDS, a standardized specification maintained by the Object Management
Group (OMG), is available from the DDS Foundation website and offers
both a Platform Independent Model (PIM) and a Platform Specific Model
(PSM) [11]. The standard guides for vendors to produce compliant implementations using five distinct modules: infrastructure, domain, topic-definition,
publication, and subscription modules. The modules with the Real-Time
Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) wire protocol collectively define the commonality
between vendor implementations that enable interoperability as a distributed
middleware solution.
DDS supports distributed applications serving a many-to-many communication architecture. The standard employs a Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe

4

Quantifying DDS-Cerberus Network Control Overhead

(DCPS) communication pattern between domain participants using topics.
Figure 1 is a partially reproduced model of the significant domain entities from
the DDS specification, version 1.4. All domain participants are either publishers or subscribers to a given topic. Communication includes a series of cache
change messages accepted into a participant’s history cache. Quality of Service
(QoS) policies configure the mechanics governing these cache changes and are
tied to publishers, subscribers, and topics. Comparison of the QoS offered by
publishers to those required by subscribers determines whether participants
can be matched for communication. The standard defines the results for comparisons between QoS levels so that publishers match subscribers for which
they are overqualified but never match with subscribers that promise less than
the service required by those subscribers.

Fig. 1 Partial DDS Entity Model [12]

Developers using DDS have already accepted a degree of network control
overhead to access the rich set of QoS available for tuning communication
behavior between distributed entities. The overhead is configurable beyond
mandatory headers and allows developers to add canned behaviors by allocating network resources to the topics that require them. After developers have
elected to use DDS as a middleware, they may add a layer of security to the
distributed communication. That layer is not without its overhead additions
and is the subject of the comparisons made in this research. While DDS delivers the correct data at the right time, security can be viewed as a possible QoS
not yet included in the standard list, ensuring the right participants receive
the data rather than actors.
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2.2 DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C)
DDS-C is a novel security layer incorporating Kerberos ticketing with DDS
publishers and subscribers [9, 10]. It provides additional security by validating
nodes and preventing impersonation attacks.
Kerberos is an open authentication protocol that uses tickets to control
communication in a network. Each Kerberos setup has a specific realm name.
Users who want to authenticate using a network need to know the realm’s
name and have a registered principal, basically a username.
DDS-C utilizes long-term keys, named keytabs that Kerberos provides to
create tickets. These tickets are the products of the successful authentication
of publishers and subscribers. The benefit of using DDS-C is that once a node
is registered and authenticated, there is no extra need to communicate with
the central Kerberos server. For example, in a real-time operational network
with IoT devices, this authentication would happen before a node publishes
or subscribes.
Figure 2 presents the process for creating, storing, and using keytabs. In
step 1, the Kerberos server is responsible for the credentials corresponding
to each or a set of publishers and subscribers. A Kerberos server consists of
a Key Distribution Center (KDC) that includes two main components: the
Authentication Server (AS) and Ticket Granting Server (TGS). An admin
would create credentials that nodes use to authenticate. When authenticating,
the node first messages the AS to receive a ticket from the TGS. A ticket has
a default time-to-live of 24 hours; however, an admin can change this to a
shorter or longer time.
During step 2, an admin queries and saves the keytabs to the appropriate machine where DDS resides before a node can send data. The keytabs
do not expire, which is essential in operations where time is sometimes not
determined.
In step 3, the DDS-C device has a Kerberos server to communicate with
the central server. Additionally, an admin can host the Kerberos server in the
cloud to provide authentication for the nodes and support keytab generation.
At step 4, publishers and subscribers use a keytab for authentication. This
keytab would preferably be created just for a single node to use. The node
containing the publishers and subscribers would receive the Kerberos server’s
response. If a ticket is received, the node is authorized to send and read data.
Otherwise, the node is not permitted to send or access any data.
Figure 3 is a sequence diagram outlining the flow of the authentication
messages transmitted when Publisher1 and Subscriber1 publish and read messages. The leftmost gray area, “Node utilizing KDC”, represents the keytabs
that were created and stored for Publisher1 and Subscriber1. The DDS node
leverages the keytabs to request and receive tickets from the rightmost gray
area, the central Kerberos server “Kerberos Server KDC.” Messages flow as
follows:
A. Publisher1 Authentication:
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Fig. 2 DDS-C Keytab Process [10]

(0) Publisher1 authenticates and requests a ticket using a keytab. The
AS receives Publisher1’s message.
(1) The AS sends a message back for the TGS. A shared key, only known
between the AS and TGS, encrypts this message. Publisher1 sends
this message to the TGS to get a ticket.
(2) The TGS sends a ticket to the Kerberos Server KDC.
B. Publisher1 Authenticated:
(3) Afterwards, Publisher1 is successfully authenticated and can send its
messages to the DDS domain. Server KDC.
C. Subscriber1 Authentication:
(4) Subscriber1 authenticates and requests a ticket using a keytab. The
AS receives Subscriber1’s message.
(5) The AS sends a message back for the TGS. A shared key, only known
between the AS and TGS, encrypts this message. Subscriber1 sends
this message to the TGS to get a ticket.
(6) The TGS sends a ticket to the Kerberos Server KDC.
D. Subscriber1 Authenticated:
(7) Afterwards, Subscriber1 is successfully authenticated and can read
messages. In this case, it would be reading data sent from Publisher1.
E. Subsequent Messages:
(8) Since Publisher1 and Subscriber1 authenticated, no further authentication is needed.
(9) Message i with Topic is sent from Publisher1 and received by
Subscriber1.
(10) Message i + 1 with Topic is sent from Publisher1 and received by
Subscriber1.
The Publisher1 and Subscriber1 authentication sequence can be redone as
many times as needed. The admin has the choice to re-authenticate new tickets
at any interval of time—for example, a check with the central Kerberos server
after 24 hours for all nodes; however, this research does not go into this use
case and is considered for future work.
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Fig. 3 DDS-C Authentication Process [10]

The inability to validate nodes is a security concern for DDS [6–8]. By
implementing DDS-C, all nodes need to authenticate with the Kerberos server
before sending or receiving messages. DDS-C invalidates a node if Kerberos
sends back an error message resulting in no sent ticket. Additionally, an
attacker wanting to send or read data would have to communicate with the
Kerberos Server to get a ticket. Figure 4 presents DDS-C mitigating an attacker
using an impersonation attack. In step 1, an attacker gets on the same network where DDS-C resides. In step 2, the attacker creates an impersonated
node; however, any node on the server needs to get a ticket before performing
any operations. In steps 3 and 4, since the attacker did not provide the correct
keytab, it cannot get a valid ticket; therefore, DDS-C prevents the unauthenticated node from interacting with other nodes. Kerberos stores the keytabs
and tickets in \tmp and when the system shuts down, those files are deleted.
DDS-C is a security layer added onto DDS to authenticate DDS nodes
with Kerberos tickets. The following three subsections explore other pieces of
literature that aid in understanding DDS-C experiments.
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Fig. 4 DDS-C Mitigating Impersonation [10]

2.3 DDS Performance Evaluations
Other researchers have measured the performance qualities of DDS, such as
latency [13–16]. While measuring latency is an essential benchmark for realtime communication middleware, there are methods to collect the information
and many other factors that influence end-to-end latency. The cited works all
measure latency, but they collect slightly different information that provides
unique insights into the middleware’s performance in various environments
and configurations.
Relatively early works used wired networks to conduct experiments.
In 2012, Yang et al. compared DDS communication performance to that
obtainable using traditional sockets [13]. They used the OpenSplice DDS
implementation provided by Prism Tech to accomplish distributed communication mapped within the IEC 61499 standard. The authors examined the
impact of message size, network load, and QoS configurations on latency.
They also provide the distribution of latency observed over 1 million iterations. The experiment measured latency by placing timestamps in a message
making a round-trip to and back from a node on an Ethernet network connected via a switch. They defined latency as half the measured round-trip
time. The test environment used real-time patched Ubuntu operating systems
on all nodes. The authors performed tests in this environment to gain insight
relevant to distributed industrial control systems which can be realized using
similar environments. The results measured roughly 10 times the latency standard deviation of DDS compared to sockets (109 microseconds compared to
10) and a smaller message size before the rapid growth of latency. The authors
concluded that DDS offered more favorable simplification for complex network
architectures than a traditional socket implementation. DDS began to incur
rapid latency growth after message sizes exceeded 2048 bytes but were less sensitive to network load than traditional sockets. Finally, results illustrated the
successful capability of DDS to tailor communication performance according
to latency budget and transport priority QoS.

Quantifying DDS-Cerberus Network Control Overhead

9

Later, works began to include wireless topology in DDS evaluation experiments. In 2015, Almadani et al. evaluated DDS-based middleware over a
wireless channel for re-configurable manufacturing systems (RMS) [14]. With
Real-Time Innovations (RTI) DDS implementation, the authors measured
latency, jitter, and throughput for payload and headers sent over industrialgrade WiFi and Bluetooth wireless channels. Rather than a simple one-to-one
communication architecture, these authors used one-to-many and many-tomany. The experimental setup used simulation to mimic the endpoint behavior
of an RMS and measured traffic over the physical channels. Results illustrated that although DDS over WiFi obtained lower latency and tighter jitter,
Bluetooth enabled much greater throughput because the peer-to-peer communication strategy was not funneled through an access point. Notably, the
processing speed of the access point was not provided and could be the source
of some throughput limitation. Although the WiFi throughput was lower, it
achieved roughly 7 Mbps and may be sufficient for some applications.
Other works used virtual networks to collect performance in deliberately
degraded environments. In 2016, Chen and Kunz compared the performance
of DDS to other IoT protocols, including Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP), Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), and a custom User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) [15]. The intended environment for evaluation in
this work was a constrained network used for medical monitoring of multiple
sensors. The test environment consisted of various sensors connected to an
Arduino in series with a Raspberry Pi device connected to a Linksys router
with a laptop acting as a central server. They used virtual networking software
to simulate various packet loss, bandwidth, and system latency conditions.
Testing observed bandwidth consumption, experienced latency, and experienced packet loss over multiple combinations of environment settings. The
authors selected OpenDDS as the implementation of DDS. They also compared the protocols by their quantity of control overhead as a percentage of
the payload size. The research showed that DDS experienced the most significant portion of control overhead, but the payload size was held constant at a
relatively small 409 bytes. Again, latency was measured as half the round trip
time experienced by a single message.
As recent as 2019, works began comparing DDS performance while examining the effects of network and computational loads. Profanter et al. conducted
performance comparisons between DDS, Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA), ROS, and MQTT [16]. These authors selected
eProsima’s FastDDS implementation of DDS. They began by examining the
traffic required in bytes to connect the listed protocols. ROS and DDS required
the most traffic to connect with 8915 and 8348 bytes, respectively. For DDS,
this number resulted from a summation over discovery traffic before publisher/subscriber matching. The authors continued to measure the impact of
network and CPU loads on RTT for the various protocols over increasing message sizes. DDS latency was dependent on CPU and network load, but the
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significance of their impact was not statistically evaluated. All latency measurements appeared relatively constant for small message sizes but exhibited
a rise when message sizes surpassed a fixed point, potentially related to the
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU).

2.4 Kerberos Evaluations
Al-Masri et al. surveyed various IoT messaging protocols that reside on the
application layer of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model [5]. Comparing these protocols reinforces the benefits of choosing the proper lightweight
communication protocol for low-power IoT devices, reliability, network traffic, and latency. No one protocol is universally used. Zorkadis presented the
OSI security architecture guidelines [17]. There are five classes of security:
authentication, access control, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation.
Zorkadis explained performance costs due to security by using the queuing
theory. The author offered optimization recommendations for securing these
communication protocols.
Any added security to DDS should not interrupt real-time communication
performance. Also, security features added should not hinder the performance
of Kerberos. Kirsal et al. coauthored and published three papers that proposed
increasing Kerberos security by using frequent key renewal for a local area
network [18–20]. They utilized CASPER for the first paper’s security analysis. Subsequent papers used Markov Reward models to illustrate Kerberos
states. The papers provide a methodology for understanding a novel protocol
in Kerberos; however, they do not contain substantial information on what
applications and setup they used to gather such data.
Researchers Harbitter and Menascé evaluate public-key performance in
Kerberos with Cross-Realm (PKCROSS) and Public Key Utilizing Tickets for
Application Servers (PKTAPP) with a five-step approach in the server and
network [21]. They measured both proposals by their messages with the KDC.
The first step was to create a testbed with code that monitored service times
and message sizes. Then they developed a closed queuing network to represent
public key extensions. They compared the testbed results with the queuing
model to determine the accuracy with several realms and servers. Finally, they
analyzed the changes in service time and network delay to understand dependencies. The results from comparing the two proposals showed that PKCROSS
outperformed PKTAPP.
Evaluating existing Kerberos implementations is essential for research, but
the development of new Kerberos mechanisms is also equally important. Eum
and Choi proposed a new authentication mechanism in Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) named EAP-Kerberos II [22]. This protocol mitigated
three security concerns of wireless local area networks (WLANs) for an 802.11
network: rogue access points (APs), unprotected messages, and message delay.
802.11i has existing security measures using Transport Layer Security (TLS)
and Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) over EAP. Instead of TLS or
AKA, EAP-Kerberos II utilized Kerberos’s function as a trusted third party
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in a mutual authentication by adapting it into EAP. The reason to use Kerberos tickets is that Kerberos does not require significant computational power
or memory space to store a certificate. They measured the number of messages sent between EAP-TLS, EAP-AKA, and EAP-Kerberos II. They also
compared the message’s round trip times (RTT), processing delay in clocks
per message, and RTTs when the access point is far from the Authentication
Server. They concluded that EAP-Kerberos II is more efficient than the other
two protocols since it requires fewer authentication servers and sends fewer
RTTs.

2.5 ROS 2 Evaluations
ROS 2 evolved from ROS 1, and both primarily differ at the communication
layer. [23] ROS and ROS 2 both support robotics and IoT communication use
cases. They can be used and set up together, but the main difference is that
ROS 2 has the capability for real-time communication between devices. This
paper uses ROS 2 for its real-time capability and recent development.
Kronauer et al. measured latency on ROS 2 middleware to provide guidelines on designing ROS 2 architectures and reducing traffic overhead. They
utilized three DDS implementations, eProsima FastRTPS, Eclipse Cyclone
DDS, and RTI Connext, using ROS 2 Foxy Fitzroy [24]. Their selected
BEST EFFORT QoS does not require re-transmitting lost frames since the
majority will go through; this is emulating their use case of using sensors. They
measured latency via node scalability on localhost using a ping-pong scenario
with payloads of 128 B and 500 KB sent over UDP. Afterward, they provided
a list of techniques that affect latency.
In addition to the previously mentioned DDS implementations, Maruyama
et al. compared ROS 1 and ROS 2 by measuring latency, throughput, number
of threads, and memory consumption [25] across three different DDS implementations: Connext, OpenSplice, and FastRTPS. They choose different QoS
policies to get varied results for each DDS implementation.
Other research measured latency and throughput in different network settings. Park et al. compared ROS 1 and ROS 2 characteristics by measuring the
real-time performance of the software stack and communication [26]. Utilizing
various nodes, they collected message loss rates and latency times and represented them through statistical mean, maximum, minimum, and standard
deviation. The authors also utilized a multi-agent service robot to verify the
real-time performance. Their results showed that ROS 1 did not meet real-time
requirements.
In addition to measuring latency, Thulasiraman et al. set up a small network of two and five nodes in ROS 2 to measure performance in a lossy wireless
environment [27]. They utilized NS-3, an open-source network simulator, to
measure latency and message drop rate. By varying QoS and security configurations, they concluded that enabling more security features leads to a higher
messaged drop rate with any QoS policies and that scaling with more nodes
leads to increased message latency.
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Researching the impact of other security implementations should be considered when experimenting DDS-C. Kim et al. concentrate on the performance
of additional security implementations on top of default ROS 2 and DDS security features since the default DDS middleware in ROS 2 does not conform to
security specifications set by OMG [28]. They have two performance metrics:
estimated latency and estimated throughput. Additionally, they configured
them into both wired and wireless configurations when setting up performance
benchmark scenarios. The three security situations include using no security, cryptographic algorithms, and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/TLS through
OpenVPN. The authors also used Cppcheck, a static analysis error checking
tool, to conduct further security analysis. They concluded that using a VPN
is a secure choice in simple system architectures.
This section explained DDS and DDS-C architecture and core functions. It
also presented other pieces of literature to support the motivation for testing
DDS performance and security. This information helps understand the research
experiment setup, execution, and analysis.

3 Experiment
Table 1 outlines sequential experimental steps measuring the security packet
traffic from DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C). First, the statistical approach for the
Design of Experiments (DoE) is determined. Next is setting up the experiment
testbed with the appropriate software which includes Kerberos and ROS 2
(Robot Operating System). Afterwards, the assumptions and limitations are
listed. The final step is to process captured packets using scripts on a Windows
machine.
Table 1 Experiment Parts
Subsection

Step

Description

3.1

Statistical
Approach

DoE theory used to draw statistical conclusions regarding the significance of the burden imposed by security.

3.2

Apparatus

The equipment, Kerberos, and ROS 2 setup experimentation.

3.3

Assumptions
and
Limitations

Considering what are the research assumptions and limitations of the experiments.

3.4

Data
Processing

The general steps to collect and process the data.

3.1 Statistical Approach
Design of Experiment (DoE) methods provide experimenters with an unbiased,
mathematical framework to evaluate the significance of statistical results [29].
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DoE offers statistical mechanisms to test on hypotheses concerning response
variables of different types. Many research measure latency as Round Trip
Time (RTT) for Data Distribution Service (DDS); however, this approach
is not consistent in different network environments. Instead, using a more
portable response variable such as packet traffic overhead provides standardized results. Sadjadi et al. introduce the need for environment agnostic
performance measures, particularly in the distributed system arena [30]. They
introduce a statistical model to estimate the execution time for a task at a
distributed node. The following two paragraphs expound upon the deficiencies
of RTT to evaluate the performance of DDS across environments, especially
when compared to itself.
Several vendors provide DDS implementations. ROS 2 supports several of
these vendors. Unless vendors use the same code, their implementations require
different instructions to execute standard behavior. While a given implementation affects one component of the end-to-end latency experienced by a DDS
application, the overall RTT depends on more factors. Profanter et al. showed
that central processing unit (CPU) and network loads also impact the RTT
experienced by a DDS message [16].
At each stage of the end-to-end process, the RTT experienced is proportional to the amount and size of traffic, the computational hardware’s
performance, and the efficiency of the software controlling the hardware. Further, the actual RTT of a message is influenced by the distance it must travel
through the communication medium. For these reasons, RTT can make a
reasonable response variable when comparing DDS to other communication
solutions in a fixed environment. However, this research compares the performance of DDS to itself with a change in security. To increase the portability of
these results to other environments, RTT is not used. Since the standard specifies the behavior of the middleware to be interoperable, the message quantity
and content are expected to be far less variable between environments and
implementations than RTT. Therefore, the response variable is the total network traffic in bytes required to send a fixed quantity of published messages
containing a fixed size payload between a set number of participants.
The Student’s t-test is one of the tools used in DoE. It is uniquely suited
to test hypotheses on means where the population variance is unknown. Testing whether the population mean traffic in bytes generated by DDS to execute
a fixed quantity of published messages without authentication, µ0 , is significantly different than the population mean traffic required to complete the
same communication with authentication, µ1 . The p-value from the calculated
test statistic is compared to alpha to determine whether a null hypothesis, H0 ,
can be rejected. α is commonly set to 0.05 and 0.01, an acceptable probability for an incorrect rejection. The null hypothesis is that there is no difference
between the population means. If the null hypothesis is rejected, sufficient
evidence suggests a difference in population mean traffic in bytes generated
by DDS to execute a fixed quantity of published messages with and without
authentication.
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3.2 Experiment Apparatus
The experiment testbed for DDS-C utilizes ROS 2 Foxy Fitzroy and Kerberos
[31, 32]. Foxy Fitzroy was selected because of its long-term support and its
use of eProsima Fast-RTPS [33]. Four pieces of apparatus are used—a Netgear
R6100 router, a Dell XPS 13 Laptop personal computer (PC), and two Raspberry Pi 4B devices. Table 2 lists the main equipment and its specifications.
The names from the table distinguish the three main pieces of equipment:
Foxy1, Foxy2, and Kerby. All three devices need Kerberos installed; however,
Kerby’s Kerberos is the main KDC of interest for the experiments. Foxy1 and
Foxy2 additionally have ROS 2 Foxy Fitzroy installed, architectures amd64
and arm64, respectively [34]. Figure 5 is the testbed network diagram. The
three devices connect wirelessly to the same router and are logically on the
same network subnet. Foxy1 and Foxy2’s nodes have to request and receive
tickets from Kerby to authenticate prior to sending messages to each other.
Table 2 Equipment Specifications
Laptop PC: ROS 2

Raspberry Pi:
ROS 2

Raspberry Pi:
KDC

Name

Foxy1

Foxy2

Kerby

Machine

XPS 13 9310

Raspberry Pi 4B

Raspberry Pi 4B

OS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

CPU

11th Gen i7-1185G7

ARM Cortex-A72

ARM Cortex-A72

Disk
Space

2 TB

64 GB

256 GB

RAM

31 GB

8 GB

8 GB

Each ROS 2 node has either one publisher or subscriber. Each publisher to
one subscriber sends a total of 10 messages at 0.5-second intervals. For scalability, there are six sets of publisher and subscriber nodes with a two publisher
to one subscriber ratio: 2:1, 4:2, 6:3, 8:4, 10:5, and 12:6. The total amount of
messages for each ratio: 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120. Each subscriber node receives
10 messages from two publisher nodes for a total of 20 messages, as shown in
Figure 6. Every 2:1 node pairing has a unique topic. The message payload is a
“Hello World: i” string where i is the message counter. Other payload sizes are
not experimented with because they do not impact authentication, starting at
the beginning of a node’s life cycle.
All nodes have set Quality of Service (QoS) policies for queue size, reliability, and durability as shown in Table 3. These three are set to ensure different
node and message behaviors. ROS 2 sets all other QoS settings to their default
values [35]. The experiment modifies reliability, switching between best effort
and reliable. Queue size is 10 messages, and durability is transient local. Every
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Fig. 5 Experiment Testbed Network Diagram

node has a unique credential that is created and managed by Kerby. When
authenticating, a node needs to know their Kerberos principal and realm and
access their respective keytab.
Table 3 Experiment QoS Settings
QoS

Selected

Description

Depth

Queue size = 10

Queues messages for a subscriber based on message
traffic to it.

Reliability

Best Effort
Reliable

Some messages may be lost due to the network.
Messages are guaranteed to be sent through retries.

Durability

Transient Local

Publisher persists messages for subscribers that join
the network late.

There are two different network configurations. The first configuration uses
only Foxy1 and Kerby, and the second configuration uses Foxy1, Foxy2, and
Kerby. Each configuration is tested with the dependent variables listed in Table
4.
1. Foxy1 with Kerby : Foxy1’s publisher and subscriber nodes are on the
same laptop PC and authenticate with Kerby. Before each node operation,
they authenticate through Kerby by receiving a ticket. Afterward, the
publishers send messages to the subscribers.
2. Foxy1/Foxy2 with Kerby : All publisher nodes are on Foxy1, and all
subscribers are on Foxy2. Once the nodes authenticate through Kerby,
the publishers send messages, and the subscribers read them.
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Table 4 Configuration Dependent Variables
Variables

Description

QoS

Option to lose some messages with best effort or guarantee all messages are sent with reliable.

Node Count and Ratios

Increasing number of nodes with each larger ratio
increases number of messages.

With and Without DDS-C

Run experiments with and without DDS-C to analyze
its security traffic impact.

Fig. 6 Experiment Node Layout [10]

3.3 Assumptions and Limitations
This subsection outlines the experiment’s assumptions and limitations,
byproducts of the setup, configurations, and processing. The list of assumptions are as follows:
• For ROS 2, nodes do not fail authentication and that an attacker does
not compromise nodes.
• All publishers send all 10 messages, and all subscribers receive the
specified messages.
• No Kerberos principals were renewed with new keys or keytabs; the same
ones were used in all test iterations.
• For data processing, only pertinent captured packet protocols such as
Real-Time Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) were included in packet analysis.
Protocols such as NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS), which Wireshark sends
out when it starts to sniff, and Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP),
discovery of plug and play devices, are excluded and deemed extraneous
due to low packet captures and low relevancy to DDS-C security.
• All RTPS packets without the predefined publish payload were categorized as discovery+.
Limitations of the experiment include:
• The experiments occur in a local area network with the same subnet,
thereby confining the nodes to a controlled network with less outside
packet noise. In future work, more packet noise could be desired if DDS-C
is tested in a more lossy environment or different networks.
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• Nodes send fixed size payloads with a set time interval of 0.5 seconds for
all network configurations, which is appropriate since packet quantity was
measured regardless of latency.
• Selected QoS limits the message’s behavior, and more combinations could
be implemented. Using the reliability QoS is essential because it allows
for message retransmissions. Still, the scope could widen to other QoS
properties if other DDS-C properties were explored.
• Selection of total categorized network traffic as the response variable for
statistical testing provides one component of the overall overhead of using
DDS-C. The remaining overhead components are environment-dependent.
• Default usage of simple discovery protocols changes the total traffic compared to other discovery methods. Other discovery methods may change
the sensitivity of statistical tests to the mean difference in traffic-induced
by authentication.

3.4 Data Processing
Data processing is the final step. The data is successfully collected first on
Foxy1 and Foxy2 and then transferred to a separate Windows machine for
processing and formatting.
The ROS 2 launch command executes a modifiable script that specifies
which nodes to run simultaneously at the start of each configuration. When
the nodes run, Wireshark, used on Foxy1, and tcpdump, used on Foxy2, collect
the packets sent from Kerberos and ROS 2 [36, 37]. The .pcap files are then
sent to a Windows machine for processing.
The Power Shell Tabluation Script, as shown in Listing 1, filters the packet
capture files into columns of data fields via tshark [38, 39]. Next, it automatically sums the total bytes captured for each category, dumping the results to a
comma-separated value (CSV) files. This example pseudocode does not display
all the column fields extracted but includes two to show that the command
can accept additional fields.
Listing 1 Tabulation Script
ForEach( $file in $list_of_files )
{
tshark.exe -2 -r $file -T fields ...
-E "Separator=," ...
-e "frame.protocols" ...
-e "frame.len"
}
The research extracted message sizes to identify and categorize messages
transmitting the published payload. The published data had a fixed message
size of 44 bytes in these experiments. This size was unique to data publish messages and presented a suitable criterion to categorize a packet as a
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data message. The protocols field identified packets belonging to the security category as they were the only packets sent using either Domain Name
System (DNS) or Kerberos protocol. All other packets sent using the RealTime Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) protocol were categorized as discovery+. This
category represented the traffic associated with typical DDS network traffic
overhead.
Python was used to apply Student’s T-tests to the summed traffic for
each configuration’s participant count [40]. The SciPy.Stats module provides
the stats.t.cdf function to evaluate the p-values given the test statistic
and degrees of freedom [41]. To better understand the software used, Table 5
presents information about the names, locations, versions, and descriptions of
all the software.
Table 5 Experiment Software Information
Name

Version

Location

ROS 2

Foxy Fitzroy

Foxy1, Foxy2

Kerberos

V5

Foxy1, Foxy2, Kerby

Wireshark

3.2.3

Foxy1

tcpdump

4.9.3

Foxy2

tshark

3.4.7

Windows

PowerShell

5.1.19041.1237

Windows

Python

3.9.7

Foxy1, Foxy2, Windows

SciPy

1.7.0

Windows

3.5 Experiment Results
This section summarizes the experiment’s results. Plots illustrate the growth
of three categories of network traffic, data message, security, or discovery+,
resulting from increased participants. Although nodes sent relatively small
data amounts, security traffic was indistinguishable due to the dominant
discovery+ traffic and its associated variance.
To illustrate the magnitude of the differences in means relative to the sample variances required to reject the null hypothesis, Figure 7 plots the observed
spread of the traffic quantity observed in MB for each participant count with
and without security. The relative magnitude of the difference erodes as more
participants enter the domain. These values are used to calculate the p-values
in Table 6.
Table 6 lists the p-values for the two different configurations with the best
effort and reliable QoS. In all cases with three participants, the addition of
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Table 6 Configuration p-values
Participants

Best Effort
Foxy1 with
Kerby

Reliable
Foxy1 with
Kerby

Best Effort
Foxy1/Foxy2
with Kerby

Reliable
Foxy1/Foxy2
with Kerby

3
6
9
12
15
18

0.0221
0.0151
0.218
0.290
0.742
0.610

0.0271
0.134
0.249
0.614
0.603
0.482

0.0071
0.170
0.445
0.651
0.440
0.532

0.0071
0.197
0.357
0.274
0.546
0.339

1 Statistically

significant p-values with α 0.05.

security imposed a statistically significant change in mean traffic on the network. However, in most cases, the difference in mean traffic set by security
was not statistically significant by six participants. For the statistically significant values, the discovery traffic growth with each participant dominated the
other traffic sources. Although one of the configurations with six participants
indicated significant traffic due to security, the significance was diminished by
nine participants.
Multiple factors could have influenced the delayed insignificance experienced by the best effort configuration using Foxy 1 with Kerby. The best effort
configurations generally resulted in less traffic, making the conclusion more
sensitive to minor differences. Additionally, the configuration using only Foxy 1
with Kerby was less lossy than the configuration involving Foxy 2. The reduced
loss resulted in less variance, further sensitizing the test to smaller differences
in means. Combining these effects required more participants before the security traffic could be considered insignificant. The p-values show that adding
DDS-C requires statistically insignificant additional traffic for reasonably sized
experiments.
Figures 8 and 9 layout both configurations, Foxy1 with Kerby and
Foxy1/Foxy2 with Kerby, with QoS best effort and reliable. They plot the
packet traffic categorized as data message, security, and discovery+:
• Data message: traffic represents the captured packets for messages sent
from publishers to subscribers.
• Security traffic: represents packets for Kerberos server communication.
• Discovery+ traffic: includes all additional traffic that consists of a
majority of but is not limited to DDS node discovery messages. Other
traffic categorized as discovery+ has meta traffic used by DDS to ensure
QoS, such as heartbeat messages and acknowledgments.
In both figures, the traffic grows with increased participants. Visually, discovery+ traffic is about two orders of magnitude greater than data message
and security traffic. It also has a steeper slope than the other two categories
and could fit a higher-order model. Notably, the plotted discovery+ traffic
uses units of MB while the other two are in KB. If not considering discovery+
traffic in the statistical calculations, the security traffic would be statistically
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Fig. 7 Experiment Results. Top row: Best Effort Foxy1 with Kerby Variance 3 and 6.
Middle row: Best Effort Foxy1 with Kerby Variance 9 and 12. Bottom row: Best Effort Foxy1
with Kerby Variance 15 and 18.

significant for all participant configurations. This observation would be accurate if nodes sent messages with User Datagram Protocol (UDP) rather than
RTPS as provided by DDS. However, in this case, due to the overwhelming
collection of discovery+ messages, the security overhead is shown to not be
statistically significant for the majority of all participant sets. Due to a lossy
network configuration and reliability QoS, Figure 9 best effort data message
traffic is different from the relative reliable plot. This reliable plot is similar to Figure 8’s data message traffic plots for both best effort and reliable.
Reliability QoS does not significantly change the amount of traffic in all performed configurations. Nonetheless, even with a lossy environment, the overall
trend indicates that security traffic does not produce enough traffic overhead
to significantly deter the use of security mechanisms in both QoS reliabilities.
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Fig. 8 Experiment Results. Left column: Best Effort Foxy1 with Kerby. Right column:
Reliable Foxy1 with Kerby.

This section outlined how the statistical model, network and ROS 2 setup,
and processing software support the experiment results. It illustrated the
defined process and setup to efficiently acquire, process, and analyze data, and
examined the results collected by these methods and software. DDS-C is not
statistically significant enough, as seen with the majority of configurations, to
hinder DDS.

4 Conclusion
This research explored the cost of using DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) to provide
security. The experiment hosted DDS-C in a local subnet by authenticating
publisher and subscriber nodes. The results revealed the mean security traffic incurred by DDS-C to send a given amount of data between authenticated
nodes is indistinguishable from traffic quantity observed from comparable
experiments without authentication. Analyzing results from both Quality of
Service (QoS) best effort and reliable show that the difference in mean traffic
is insignificant for use cases involving anything more than small numbers of
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Fig. 9 Experiment Results. Left column: Best Effort Foxy1/Foxy2 with Kerby. Right column: Reliable Foxy1/Foxy2 with Kerby.

participants sharing a few messages of small size. These results indicate that
DDS-C applied to other Data Distribution Service (DDS) implementations
adds extra benefit without substantial performance costs. Understanding this
information is crucial in applying DDS-C to future research.
Future research could improve the existing DDS-C design and integrate it
into real-time systems. For instance, creating a Kerberos node that facilitates
ticket retrieval to handle a more significant number of nodes. This idea can
also lead to experimenting with re-authentication throughout the lifetime of
a node to observe the authentication traffic impact. Another proposal could
integrate DDS-C into a QoS policy or experimenting with other QoS policies
besides reliability. Also, DDS-C can be experimented with integrating authentication with other ROS 2 (Robot Operating System) components: services
and actions. DDS-C is still in development and requires more real-world use
case experimentation before operational use.
Concerning analysis, future work could include regression tests to estimate
model parameters for linear and non-linear models. As the effect of authentication was found to diminish to insignificance for reasonably sized domains,
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its parameter was not estimated. Instead, future work could further investigate the discovery+ category of traffic and any factors affecting its component
of the response variable. These parameters would facilitate the application of
these results to predict performance in other scenarios. The process of applying
the predictive power of this response variable could be refined and validated
in the following work, similar to that of Sadjadi et al. [30].
Technologies and middleware are constantly evolving. Further research
is needed to improve DDS security and performance. DDS-C is one option
that provides that extra security to any DDS implementation, increasing data
integrity and node trust.
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[23] Erős, E., Dahl, M., Bengtsson, K., Hanna, A., Falkman, P.: A ROS2 based
communication architecture for control in collaborative and intelligent
automation systems. Procedia Manufacturing 38, 349–357 (2019)
[24] Kronauer, T., Pohlmann, J., Matthe, M., Smejkal, T., Fettweis, G.:
Latency Analysis of ROS2 Multi-Node Systems (2021)
[25] Maruyama, Y., Kato, S., Azumi, T.: Exploring the performance of
ROS2. In: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Embedded
Software, pp. 1–10 (2016)
[26] Park, J., Delgado, R., Choi, B.W.: Real-time characteristics of ROS 2.0 in
multiagent robot systems: An empirical study. IEEE Access 8, 154637–
154651 (2020)
[27] Thulasiraman, P., Chen, Z., Allen, B., Bingham, B.: Evaluation of the
Robot Operating System 2 in Lossy Unmanned Networks. In: 2020 IEEE
International Systems Conference (SysCon), pp. 1–8 (2020). IEEE

26

Quantifying DDS-Cerberus Network Control Overhead

[28] Kim, J., Smereka, J.M., Cheung, C., Nepal, S., Grobler, M.: Security
and performance considerations in ros 2: A balancing act. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1809.09566 (2018)
[29] Montgomery, D.C.: Design and analysis of experiments. John wiley & sons
(2017)
[30] Sadjadi, S.M., Shimizu, S., Figueroa, J., Rangaswami, R., Delgado, J.,
Duran, H., Collazo-Mojica, X.J.: A modeling approach for estimating
execution time of long-running scientific applications. In: 2008 IEEE
International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing, pp. 1–8
(2008). https://doi.org/10.1109/IPDPS.2008.4536214
[31] Open Robotics: “ROS 2 Foxy Fitzroy.” Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https:
//docs.ros.org/en/foxy/Releases/Release-Foxy-Fitzroy.html
[32] MIT Kerberos: “Kerberos V5 System Administrator’s Guide.” Accessed
Oct 11, 2021. https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/krb5-1.10/krb5-1.10.7/doc/
krb5-admin.html
[33] Arguedas, M., Ragnarok, S., Thomas, D.: “ROS 2 Releases and Target
Platforms.” Accessed Oct 11, 2021 (2020). https://ros.org/reps/rep-2000.
html
[34] “Releases.” Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https://github.com/ros2/ros2/
releases
[35] Open
Robotics:
“About
Quality
of
Service
settings.”
Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https://docs.ros.org/en/foxy/Concepts/
About-Quality-of-Service-Settings.html
[36] Wireshark: “Wireshark.” Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https://www.wireshark.
org/
[37] The Tcpdump Group: “TCPDUMP/LIBPCAP public repository.”
Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https://www.tcpdump.org/
[38] Wireshark: “tshark.” Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https://www.wireshark.org/
docs/man-pages/tshark.html
[39] “PowerShell.” Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/
windows-server/administration/windows-commands/powershell
[40] “Python 3.0 Release.” Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https://www.python.org/
download/releases/3.0/
[41] “SciPy.” Accessed Oct 11, 2021. https://scipy.org/

VI. Paper: Distribution of DDS-Cerberus Authenticated
Facial Recognition Streams

The following paper, “Distribution of DDS-Cerberus Authenticated Facial Recognition Streams,” is submitted to the Journal of Supercomputing. This paper is in
Springer journal format.

52

Distribution of DDS-Cerberus Authenticated
Facial Recognition Streams
Andrew T. Park1*, Nathaniel Peck1 , Richard Dill1 , Douglas
D. Hodson1 , Michael R. Grimaila1 and Wayne C. Henry1
1 Department

of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Air Force
Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Dayton, 45433, OH, USA.
*Corresponding author(s). E-mail(s):
andrew.park075@gmail.com;
Contributing authors: 2012raptor@gmail.com;
richard.dill@afit.edu; douglas.hodson@afit.edu;
michael.grimaila@afit.edu; wayne.henry@afit.edu;
Abstract

Whether it be for humanitarian or military purposes, mission success often relies upon information and communication technologies.
Securing and selecting the middleware that handles the messages sent
between network nodes and applications is essential. One such middleware is Data Distribution Service (DDS) which employs a publishsubscribe model. However, researchers have found several security
vulnerabilities in DDS implementations. DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) is
a novel security layer implemented into DDS to mitigate impersonation attacks using Kerberos authentication and ticketing. This paper
extends our previous work by analyzing the performance of DDSC in a use case implementation. The use case covers an artificial
intelligence (AI) scenario that connects edge sensors across a commercial network. Specifically, it characterizes DDS-Cerberus in unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), the cloud, and video streams for facial recognition. An evaluation of network traffic using DDS-C revealed that it
was not statistically significant compared to DDS for the majority of
the configuration runs. The results demonstrate that DDS-C provides
security benefits without significantly hindering the overall performance.
Keywords: Kerberos, DDS, Cyclone DDS, UAV, AI, QoS
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1 Introduction
Networked sensor devices typically follow the paradigm where one node tasks
and receives input from multiple Internet of Things (IoT) devices. For example, a command node sends operational messages and receives sensor data from
multiple unmanned aerial vehicles to conduct a search and rescue operation.
These messages, ranging from simple commands to video frames, could have
Quality of Service (QoS) attributes such as retransmitting unreceived messages to ensure nodes that joined late or have re-started receive all messages.
For example, a UAV requires specific messages to navigate search and rescue
missions correctly in lossy environments. Remotely operated bases use forwarddeployed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to support battlespace surveillance
in contested environments [1]. The inter-communication links between UAVs
and external links to cloud support services need to be robust enough to send
and process video and images given terrain diversity and secure enough to
thwart adversary attacks [2, 3]. Other messages could have QoS as best effort
when a system can handle not receiving every message. For example, artificial
intelligence (AI) facial recognition software on an IoT device may not require
all frames from a live video feed to detect entities correctly. These use cases
are essential in understanding DDS-Cerberus’s (DDS-C) impact on real-world
operations.
Data Distribution Service (DDS) is an open-source middleware that has
been used in many sectors like finance, healthcare, and the military [4]. For
real-time communication, DDS messages do not need to include the intended
recipient but have a topic, represented as a unique string, from publisher to
subscriber. The subscribers receive messages based on the associated topic. The
messages have QoS properties to determine the sender and messages’ behavior.
Despite its efficient and real-time message sending capabilities, DDS is prone
to impersonation attacks which allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access
to messages [5–7].
DDS-C, a security layer for DDS, handles the authentication of DDS
participants using Kerberos tickets [8–10]. This authentication mitigates
impersonation attacks by verifying the identity of authenticated participants.
This research’s experiment captures network traffic from DDS and DDS-C to
assess if DDS-C significantly impacts regular DDS performance. It uses the
Bright Apps cloud architecture and network layout to evaluate DDS-C [11].
The experiment testbed relies on Cyclone DDS (an implementation of the
DDS Standard) and the a commercial network infrastructure. The goal is to
demonstrate that DDS-C is mature enough to support commercial artificial
intelligence (AI) applications, specifically evaluating the impact on transmitting video frames. This impact is quantified by capturing total network traffic.
The experiment emulates a network of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with
Raspberry Pi devices that send video frames. In conjunction with Bright Apps,
this experiment aims to support UAV deployment in the field with DDS-C,
such as in search and rescue. There are three use-cases detailing real-world
scenarios for Bright Apps network infrastructure applications. To address the
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three use-cases, the experiment has one network configuration whose goal is
to send video frames processed by AI over a Virtual Private Network (VPN).
The network setup consists of a Raspberry Pi device, Elastic Compute Cloud
(EC2), and laptop PC. First, the Raspberry Pi device sends video frames to
the EC2 for facial recognition AI processing, and then the PC displays the
processed frames. The same message types of interest are selected. The QoS
of interest is best effort to mimic use case scenarios. The data collected is
categorized by equipment to determine the traffic impact on each device.
This research builds on the previous paper, Park et al.’s Quantifying DDSCerberus Network Control Overhead, by collecting network packet quantities
for facial recognition streams [10]. The collected traffic is split into three categories: data message, security, and discovery+. The research determines if
DDS-C security traffic has a significant impact on the other DDS traffic by
comparing the three through statistical analysis. This paper aims to contribute
to other DDS research in use case applications.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines DDS, DDS-C, and
related works. Section 3 contains the experiment setup, assumptions and
limitations, and results. Section 4 provides future research recommendations.

2 Background
This section provides background information on the design and implementation of DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) by explaining Data Distribution Service (DDS)
and Kerberos. Additionally, it presents other similar application works that
support the development of this research’s experiment.

2.1 DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C)
DDS-C is a security layer that mitigates impersonation attacks [8–10]. It is
integrated into DDS to provide participant authentication through Kerberos.
DDS is managed by Object Management Group (OMG) and is opensource, allowing for several implementations from different vendors. Its primary
function is to handle message delivery between communicating entities. The
communication is done through topics, or unique strings, that are sent by
publishers and received by subscribers. Subscribers receive a message by specifying a unique string a message has. Quality of Service (QoS) policies dictate
publisher and subscriber behavior on how to send messages. The policies are
adapted to different network setups, such as having subscribers only read the
most recent message.
The research focuses on the Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe (DCPS) layer
containing the following components: publishers, subscribers, and domain participants. The components are seen in Figure 1 where domain participants can
contain any number of publishers and subscribers. The messages are sent with
topics to the DDS domain to be read by subscribers. Previous DDS-C research
focused on authenticating publisher and subscriber nodes, but this experiment
focuses on authenticating domain participants. Two reasons to use domain
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participants are adding and authenticating nodes becomes less of a hassle, and
they allow for easy integration into the Bright Apps architecture. Domain participants assist with executing publishers and subscribers in parallel, which
helps send multiple video frames.

Fig. 1 DCPS Layout [8]

Kerberos is an authentication protocol used on distributed networks to
authenticate users or nodes who request to talk on the network [12]. Kerberos
servers have a realm name that is used to specify where the authentication is
taking place. The kinit command grants tickets with the correct principal,
or username, realm, and password. When the command runs, the requesting
device or node communicates with Kerberos’s Key Distribution Center (KDC),
which has two main components: the Authentication Server (AS) and Ticket
Granting Server (TGS). The requester authenticates with the AS if their credentials are in the server. If credentials match, the authenticated can gain a
ticket from the TGS by a special message granted by the AS. The lifetime of
a ticket is default of 24 hours, but it is possible to change the lifetime to add
ticket security.
One important function of Kerberos that DDS-C leverages are keytabs,
long-term keys to aid in creating tickets. Each domain participant in DDS is
paired with a unique keytab for seamless authentication. These keytabs are
encrypted using AES-256. When running the kinit command, the password
has to be manually entered; however, manually typing the password is not
required if run with passing in the long-term key. This authentication is important in mitigating impersonation attacks because if the attacker does not have
access to the keytab, DDS-C does not allow them to impersonate a node or
domain participant [5–7]. The attacker would have to either replicate or steal
the long-term key, which would be difficult due to the key’s encryption and
additional network security.
Figure 2 shows these keytabs in action with a sequence diagram of two
domain participants, DP1 and DP2, authenticating with a KDC. The leftmost
gray area, “Domain Participants utilizing KDC”, represents the keytabs that
were created and stored for DP1 and DP2. DP1 contains one publisher, and
DP2 contains one subscriber. Messages flow as follows:
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A. DP1 Authentication:
(0) DP1 authenticates and requests a ticket using a keytab. The AS
receives DP1’s message.
(1) The AS sends a message back for the TGS. A shared key, only known
between the AS and TGS, encrypts this message. DP1 sends this
message to the TGS to get a ticket.
(2) The TGS sends a ticket to the Kerberos Server KDC.
B. DP1 Authenticated:
(3) Afterwards, DP1 is successfully authenticated, and the publisher can
send its messages to the DDS domain. Server KDC.
C. DP2 Authentication:
(4) DP2 authenticates and requests a ticket using a keytab. The AS
receives DP2’s message.
(5) The AS sends a message back for the TGS. A shared key, only known
between the AS and TGS, encrypts this message. DP2 sends this
message to the TGS to get a ticket.
(6) The TGS sends a ticket to the Kerberos Server KDC.
D. DP2 Authenticated:
(7) Afterwards, DP2 is successfully authenticated, and the subscriber can
read messages. In this case, it would be reading data sent from DP1’s
publisher.
E. Subsequent Messages:
(8) Since DP1 and DP2 authenticated, no further authentication is
needed.
(9) Message i with Topic is sent from DP1’s publisher and received by
DP2’s subscriber.
(10) Message i + 1 with Topic is sent from DP1’s publisher and received
by DP2’s subscriber.
DDS-C authentication executes at the beginning of a domain participant’s
lifecycle; however, this authentication can run more than once based on an
administrator’s needs. Additionally, this can be performed in conjunction with
shorter ticket lifespans. This research does not integrate these scenarios with
the experiment and is possibly integrated into future work.

2.2 Related Use Case Applications
DDS-C’s application and use cases are inspired by search and rescue and battlefield operations. Many papers provide solutions to these complex problems,
but this research focuses on those that offer solutions using unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV). Understanding the other researchers’ proposed designs and
experiments helps craft the experiment use cases and real-world application.
The first paper to inspire the experiment design was Munir et al.’s research
on proposing FogSurv, a fog-assisted architecture to be used in urban areas for
real-time surveillance using artificial intelligence (AI) [13]. They constructed
a centralized cloud server with fog nodes to offload communication and computation power burdens. Their use cases mention battlefield applications for
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Fig. 2 DDS-C Authentication Process with domain participants [10]

security and control, which this paper’s research does on a more specific scale
with DDS-C. The experiment has two scenarios with an Internet of Things
(IoT) device where in the first scenario, it offloads tasks to a fog node and
the second where it offloads it to the cloud server. They measure latency in
different experiment runs with data fusion and AI. The results revealed that
offloading to a fog node is 37% more efficient than to the cloud. The use cases
and design for broad low-power surveillance helped motivate DDS-C use case
research.
In 2017, Ribeiro et al. conducted simulated and physical experiments with
UAVs and DDS [14]. They also used a cloud architecture but focused on using
a DDS communication infrastructure. They designed a two-layer UAV network
for UAVs closer to the ground and those far away from the ground. They
selected sensors ranging from those that work near the ground to those far
away. The types of sensors on the UAV categorized what layer it would operate
in. The simulated experiments tested different network links for low bandwidth
and lossy environments in wired and wirelessly configurations. They tested

Distribution of DDS-Cerberus Authenticated Facial Recognition Streams

7

with both QoS best effort and reliable and found more throughput with reliable
QoS acknowledgments. The physical experiment only utilized one UAV with
ROS (Robot Operating System) for DDS communication with a base station
on the cloud. They observed high signal attenuation and loss of connectivity
since they used default DDS QoS policies. For future work, they plan to extend
the experiment to four UAVs.
ROS is a middleware with two versions: ROS 1 and ROS 2. The difference
is that ROS 2 uses DDS for real-time communication. In 2019, Sandoval and
Thulasiraman’s research goal was to use simulated experiments to test ROS
2’s ability to protect against cyber attacks for UAV communication [15]. This
work was to help support the integration of ROS 2 into the U.S. Navy’s UAV
swarms. Since ROS 1 was still in use for Naval UAV control, they simulated
an environment where ROS 1 and ROS 2 were connected with a bridge to control three UAVs. The first two UAVs were susceptible to rogue node attacks,
unwanted disabling and landing, due to ROS 1, but the third UAV used the
bridge with ROS 2 and its security plugins to prevent these attacks. Even
though the plugins mitigated the attacks, there was significant latency overhead due to the bridge setup. This work contributes to DDS-C by highlighting
the need for node authentication when controlling UAVs.
The related works relate to DDS-C design and experiments regarding AI,
network environments, and security. The following experiment combines these
three elements to measure DDS-C’s performance in a cloud-based network.

3 Experiment
Bright Apps developed Azoth artificial intelligence (AI) with UAVs for facial
recognition in real-world use cases like search and rescue [11]. It uses Cyclone
DDS, a variation of Data Distribution Service (DDS) developed by the Eclipse
Foundation, to send live video frames in lossy environments to be processed
by Azoth AI [16, 17]. Cyclone DDS is related to ROS 2 (Robot Operating
System) because it is a tier-1 ROS 2 Middleware Interface (RMW). It uses a
python binding which helps integrate DDS-C and the AI [18]. Bright Apps uses
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) connected to and controlled by Raspberry Pi
devices. These devices communicate with Amazon Web Services (AWS) Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instances for facial recognition processing by Azoth
AI [19]. This configuration is to mimic operations where UAVs send live video
feeds. OpenVPN connects this framework by providing additional security
and network maintenance [20]. DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) authenticates domain
participants to allow for multiple node executions. Integrating it with Bright
Apps technology is still in development, and this research presents initial work
in this integration with a real-world commercial network infrastructure. The
experiment’s results aim to support this paper’s previous experiment results
and if DDS-C authentication traffic adds negligible latency overhead to affect
normal DDS message traffic significantly.
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3.1 Experiment Apparatus
The experiment testbed for DDS-C uses Cyclone DDS and Kerberos. There are
three pieces of apparatus-one Raspberry Pi 4B device, a Dell XPS 13 Laptop
personal computer (PC), and one EC2 instance. These labels distinguish the
three pieces of equipment: Cyclone1, Cyclone2, and KerAzoth. Table 1 lists
the main equipment and its specifications. All devices have Kerberos installed.
Additionally, to communicate with each other, Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 are
OpenVPN clients, and KerAzoth is the OpenVPN server; all traffic routes
through KerAzoth from the other two. KerAzoth is located in the AWS region
code us-west-2a within Oregon. Figure 3 is this equipment’s testbed network
diagram. All components are connected wirelessly through OpenVPN and use
Cyclone DDS to communicate.
Table 1 Equipment Specifications
Raspberry Pi:
Cyclone DDS

Laptop PC:
Cyclone DDS, KDC

EC2:
Cyclone DDS, KDC

Name

Cyclone1

Cyclone2

KerAzoth

Machine

Raspberry Pi 4B

XPS 13 9310

t3.2xlarge [21]

OS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS

CPU

ARM Cortex-A72

11th Gen i7-1185G7

Intel Xeon E5-2676 v3

Disk
Space

64 GB

2 TB

58 GB

RAM

8 GB

31 GB

32 GB

Cyclone1’s domain participants authenticate with KerAzoth’s Key Distribution Center (KDC) before sending messages. Similarly, KerAzoth’s domain
participants authenticate with Cyclone2’s KDC. Cyclone1 represents the UAV
with Raspberry Pi device, Cyclone2 represents command and control (C2),
and KerAzoth represents a network bridge and AI processing.
This experiment covers three main use cases that encompass the apparatus
used in the commercial network infrastructure.
• Use Case 1 : Perform DDS-C authentication on a Raspberry Pi device
and EC2, and after authentication, both devices communicate using
Cyclone DDS. This tests communication from a Raspberry Pi device to
an EC2 on the cloud.
• Use Case 2 : Authenticate using DDS-C over a Virtual Private Network
(VPN). OpenVPN clients utilize unique credentials to communicate with
the OpenVPN server. This tests communication using a VPN between
devices and the cloud.
• Use Case 3 : Send a video feed to be processed by AI for face recognition. The video feed is sent over DDS with compressed video frames.
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Fig. 3 Experiment Network Diagram

These frames are sent with best effort reliability QoS to handle lossy
environments. This tests sending video frames over DDS for AI processing.
There is one network configuration to encompass these three use cases. It is run
with QoS best effort to mimic real-world UAV use when sending video frames.
• Cyclone with KerAzoth: All domain participants authenticate either
with Cyclone2 and KerAzoth when starting up. Cyclone1 sends compressed video frames to KerAzoth for AI processing, and when finished,
KerAzoth sends the processed frames to Cyclone2.
The scalability goal of Cyclone with KerAzoth is to increment the number
of domain participants in KerAzoth to increase DDS-C authentication traffic
and highlight the use of Azoth AI. Figure 4 and Table 2 illustrate how the
configuration participants are set up and how the frames are passed. The
figure illustrates Set 1 from the table. Cyclone1’s domain participant has one
publisher in the figure but increases, as seen in the table, by one as each set is
tested to handle video frame publishing. KerAzoth’s publisher and subscriber
node count also increases based on the experimented set. KerAzoth has one
publisher to one subscriber increasing with subsequent runs: 1:1, 2:2, 3:3, 4:4,
5:5, 6:6. Each of these ratios has a unique domain participant. Cyclone2’s one
subscriber with one domain participant does not increase in number, and it
receives all AI processed video frames to display on the laptop screen.
Cyclone1’s publishers send 100 messages with frames as data to Cyclone2.
Figure 4’s Publisher1 sends a frame with a topic, and as more publishers
are added to Cyclone1, they send different frames with unique topics. The
subscribers in KerAzoth receive these topics. Subscriber1 receives Topic1 and
applies facial recognition AI to the frame. Other subscribers would be waiting
for their respective topics. Afterward, Publisher2 sends the processed video
frame with Topic2 to Subscriber2. In this case, the publishers in KerAzoth
send the processed video frame with a topic that only Cyclone2’s subscriber
uses.
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Fig. 4 Experiment Node Layout
Table 2 Experiment Participants

Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

Set 5

Set 6

Cyclone1

Domain participants
Nodes (Pub/Sub)

1
1

1
2

1
3

1
4

1
5

1
6

Cyclone2

Domain participants
Nodes (Pub/Sub)

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

KerAzoth

Domain participants
Nodes (Pub/Sub)

1
2

2
4

3
6

4
8

5
10

6
12

To incorporate the AI, the configuration was designed to parallelize AI processsing with domain participants. With the number of messages set to 100
for every experiment iteration, the messages were divided up so each publisher
in Cyclone1 sends a unique frame to the subscriber in Cyclone2. For example, Table 2’s Set 2 has two publishers in Cyclone1’s domain participant. One
publisher would publish only odd frames and the other even frames. For subsequent Sets, the frames are divided by every third or every fourth frame for the
newly added publishers. This parallel processing is an important aspect of this
network configuration to showcase Azoth AI while also increasing participant
count for DDS-C authentication.
On all three pieces of equipment, tcpdump captured the use case experiment’s data and was sent to a separate Windows machine to be processed
[22]. The data is first run with Windows Powershell scripts involving tshark,
a Wireshark filtering tool [23, 24]. Afterward, the Student’s t-test is used to
analyze the results with a α of 0.05 using Python and SciPy [25, 26]. Since the
population variance is unknown, this test is applicable to the population of
DDS use cases discussed in this paper. Table 3 lists all the software mentioned
for the experiment.

3.2 Assumptions and Limitations
These are the experiment’s assumptions and limitations to execute the
specified network setup. The assumptions are as follows:
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Table 3 Software Information
Name

Version

Location

Cyclone DDS

0.8.1

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth

OpenVPN

2.4.7

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth

Kerberos

V5

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth

tcpdump

4.9.3

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth

tshark

3.4.7

Windows

PowerShell

5.1.19041.1237

Windows

Python

3.9.7

Cyclone1, Cyclone2, KerAzoth, Windows

SciPy

1.7.0

Windows

• Domain participants do not fail authentication and that an attacker does
not compromise them.
• Cyclone1 publishers send all 100 video frames, and KerAzoth subscribers
receive the specified messages.
• Keytabs were not renewed or changed between experiment runs.
• Relevant packet protocols such as Real-Time Publish-Subscribe (RTPS)
and Kerberos (KRB5) were selected. Protocols such as Simple Service
Discovery Protocol (SSDP) were excluded because they did not contribute
to any of the three traffic categories in analyzing DDS-C.
• All RTPS packets without the video frame payload were categorized as
discovery+.
• Azoth AI detected only one human face during experimentation. Other
experiments may incorporate more faces to analyze the AI’s processing
load on the EC2.
The limitations are as follows:
• The experiment is only performed with the us-west-2a zone. If other zones
were used, the experiment may differ with a lossier environment.
• RTPS messages containing video frames were fragmented, resulting in
more packet traffic.
• The experiment only experimented with reliability QoS of best effort. Best
effort fits the use cases; however, future experimentation could include
other QoS policies.
• Collecting the total packet traffic is only one factor in determining DDSC’s impact on DDS. Other factors could include latency and location of
equipment. The appartus in this experiment were in the same immediate
area while the EC2 was not.
• The default discovery protocols were used. The discovery+ traffic could
differ if other discovery protocols were invoked.
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3.3 Experiment Results
The data is organized based on the three used equipment as seen in Figure
5 for Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 and 6 for KerAzoth. The figures use the three
data categories: data message, security, and discovery+ traffic. The figures’
independent variable uses the total number of domain participants for each
participant set in Table 2, and the dependent variable is based on the traffic amount for each data category. The security traffic bytes in the use case
experiment are indistinguishable compared to the greater data message and
discovery+ traffic.
Table 4 shows the p-values for all three equipment. Overall, the quantity
of participants was not statistically significant; however, for seven participants, two cases were statistically significant for Cyclone2 and KerAzoth. The
network and experiment setup could have influenced this situation. The experiment setup and best effort QoS use resulted in a more lossy environment
and no packet retransmissions. The use of an EC2 brings possible unreliability with its network. With the addition of using a VPN, the sent video frames
could be lost over the network. Cyclone1 did not have a statistically significant
p-value because it is the starting point for all message traffic by sending captured video frames; only the components receiving the messages were affected.
Even though the p-values were statistically significant, the results reveal that
choosing the correct network and equipment setup is important in ensuring all
components function as intended. Also, the other participant p-values show
that this significance is uncommon and that DDS-C’s additional security traffic
did not impose a statistically significant change in the overall traffic. Instead,
the Cyclone DDS and network setup contributed to this change.
Table 4 Configuration p-values
Participants

Cyclone1

Cyclone2

KerAzoth

3
4
5
6
7
8

0.911
0.9
0.09
0.946
0.315
0.234

0.888
0.77
0.114
0.905
0.0021
0.82

0.785
0.751
0.8
0.899
0.0031
0.8

1 Statistically

significant p-values with α 0.05.

Figure 5 and 6’s data message traffic for all three components show no dramatic change overall because Cyclone1 sends out 100 video frames regardless
of participant count. Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 send traffic through KerAzoth’s
OpenVPN server; therefore, the average traffic of both Cyclone1 and Cyclone2
should be roughly equal to KerAzoth’s. For Cyclone1 and Cyclone2 the average
is around 7,509 KB, which doubled is 15,018 KB. This byte average is roughly
equal to KerAzoth’s data message traffic’s byte average of 15,028 KB. The
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Fig. 5 Experiment results. Left column: Cyclone1. Right column: Cyclone2.

figures’ security traffic is consistent with participants and their DDS-C authentication. Cyclone1 has only one domain participant to authenticate; therefore,
overall traffic has no substantial change. Cyclone2 and KerAzoth’s domain
participant count increases for each experiment run, resulting in increased
authentication and a strong positive linear correlation. Due to the consistent
participant counts, all three components’ discovery+ traffic have positive linear
correlations.
The use case experiment results show that DDS-C’s security overhead is not
statistically significant enough to hinder normal DDS operations with sending video frames. Using DDS-C in a real-world environment with architecture
similar to Bright Apps will benefit DDS security and expand its integration in
more use cases.

4 Conclusion
This research experimented DDS-Cerberus with use cases around unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV), the cloud, and video streams. The background on Data
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Fig. 6 Experiment results for KerAzoth.

Distribution Service (DDS), Kerberos, and related works on UAV-related
papers culminated into the three use cases. The experiment tested these use
cases by connecting devices through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) and
used DDS-C to authenticate domain participants. The experiment’s configuration emulated use cases for real-world operations such as using unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAV) for search and rescue. It used Cyclone DDS as its testbed
where the nodes in the domain participants deal with sending and receiving
video frames, emulating UAVs sending their video feeds for artificial intelligence (AI) processing. The Quality of Service (QoS) used was best effort to
mimic an operational environment where some frames are not needed for the
facial recognition AI. To analyze the collected traffic from the configuration,
the packets were divided into three message categories: data message, security, and discovery+ traffic. The security traffic quantity was low enough to
not be statistically significant for the majority of the configuration runs. The
results show that the mean traffic from DDS-C overhead is insignificant when
constant video frames are sent over the network. The experiment shows that
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DDS-C applied to other DDS implementations or even in conjunction with
other software adds security benefits without hindering overall performance.
Future work would incorporate middleware handling multiple Internet of
Things (IoT) devices for integration into real-time systems. The node authentication provided by DDS-C would be beneficial for search and rescue and
battlefield operations. Future research aims to integrate the use case experiment setup with multiple UAVs and more diverse AI. Additionally, as DDS-C
evolves with better functionality and features, future work could also include
experimenting with cyber attacks against it. These future work ideas could
develop, extend, and add to the use cases in this paper.
Governments, companies, and people are looking to improve existing technologies through future works. DDS-C is still in development and requires more
real-world experimentation before operational use to improve DDS security
and development.
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VII. Conclusion

This research introduced DDS-Cerberus (DDS-C) and its subsequent design, testing, and application. The initial DDS-C design was the important groundwork that
led to more robust features and diverse experiments. Integrating DDS-C into Robot
Operating System 2 (ROS 2) and Cyclone DDS widened the scope for different use
case tests and also possible integration with other Data Distribution Service (DDS)
implementations. The various experiments measured latency and packet captures to
understand DDS-C’s impact on simulated and real-world environments. Each experiment helped determine that DDS-C does not hinder DDS operations and adds
extra benefit without impeding performance. The four papers are the foundation to
DDS-C’s continued development and application in improving DDS middleware and
enforcing node and data integrity.

7.1

Future Work
DDS-C has many avenues for integration and applicability since the testbeds used

are open-source. These potential ideas could expand research on DDS-C:
• Create a DDS-C node or equivalent that would handle all authentication operations. This node is responsible for managing and categorizing tickets for nodes
allowing for centralized control of DDS-C. For example, the DDS-C node acts
as a firewall or switch that routes other nodes’ authentication requests. This
node enforces node registration through ticket pairing to identify rogue nodes.
• Add a Quality of Service (QoS) security policy that utilizes DDS-C tickets to
increase message security. Since many QoS policies determine how publishers
send out messages, DDS-C tickets can be used to be unique identifiers in ad-
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dition to the topic. The tickets can also be used to route messages to certain
subscribers.
• Integrating DDS-C into the architecture of DDS source code. This integration is
also extended to other DDS implementations such as ROS 2 and Cyclone DDS.
For example, a unique Kerberos credential is required when creating and using
any publisher or subscriber. DDS also prompts the user to have a Kerberos
setup when using DDS-C.
• Experiment DDS-C with the Real-Time Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) layer’s data
writers and data readers. Since this layer is a lower level than Data-Centric
Publish-Subscribe (DCPS), working with it offers avenues for more refined control and implementation of DDS-C. One possibility is to discover what other
DDS components can be compromised through impersonation attacks and mitigate with DDS-C authentication.
• Perform impersonation attacks against an entity that is authenticated with
DDS-C to test DDS-C’s mitigation of the attack. An idea would be to use
multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are authenticated with DDS-C
and send malicious commands to certain UAVs. Another idea would be to use
simulation software to create real-world situations. In addition to experimenting
with impersonation attacks, DDS-C can have additional features using Kerberos
tickets to mitigate other cyber attacks such as spoofing and replay attacks.
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